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[T]ear down every charitable institution in the country and build on
its ruins a temple ofjustice.
- Mary Harris "Mother" Jones1
INTRODUCTION
The principles of the Rule of Law are deeply embedded in
the discursive structure of American legal narratives, principally
as a means by which to take measure of a democratic society and
render plausible the ideals of justice and fairness.' As an abstract
principle, the Rule of Law serves as a marker of modernity,
endowed with the promise of equality, protection from private and
public abuse, and the capacity for the just resolution of disputes.3
Its symbolic value cannot be overstated. Justice for all is an ideal
cherished by citizens. To paraphrase Edward Rubin's description of
the concept of democracy, it is the "temple at which all modern
political leaders worship."'
The Rule of Law has assumed mythical proportions denoting
political virtue and public morality, but it has also produced
standards by which to measure fulfillment of the ideal. Themes of
equality and justice resonate precisely because they are conceived
as a covenant made with the body politic and generally held to be
the foundation of democratic government. Efforts to enact these
principles as a way of demonstrating the efficacy of liberty and
justice for all have summoned into existence a variety of structures
and institutions, all dedicated to upholding the Rule of Law.
1. ELLIOTT J. GORN, MOTHER JONES: THE MosT DANGEROUS WOMAN IN AMERICA 99
(2001) (quoting Mary Harris "Mother" Jones' reaction to a judge's lecture about her need to
abandon union organizing and to devote herself to charitable activities).
2. The Rule of Law is a contested concept. For purposes of this Article, however, it
refers to the traditions exemplified by John Locke and John Rawls. See JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 137, at 377 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (exhorting a
government of settled laws, not arbitrary power); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23845
(1971) (linking the Rule of Law to the concept of liberty, the exercise of freedoms, the ideals
of impartial justice, and the availability of courts to enforce the laws).
3. See ARTHURL. LIMAN, LAWYER ALIFEOFCOUNSELANDCONTROVERSY 214(1998) ("In
a civilized society, it is simply unacceptable that the only time a poor person can get into
court is when he commits a crime.").
4. Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 715 (2001).
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At the same time, another set of principles, no less prominent
in the American ethos, informs national values and acts to counter
the commitments promised in the Rule of Law. The proposition of
self-sufficiency, a kind of fierce independence and individualism, is
extolled as a fundamental virtue and celebrates the ability of
individuals to pursue and obtain economic interests in the market.5
Notions of initiative and autonomy are subsumed into concepts
of liberty-people acting as free individuals in pursuit of their
own self-interest without outside intervention, and especially
without interference, from the state." In this view, initiative and
independence serve as the minimum requirements for liberty, and
success is attained through discipline, determination, and, most of
all, hard work.' All that liberty asks of us is that we make use of
opportunities offered, assume individual responsibility, and exercise
self-discipline.' Those who do not succeed are perceived either as
lacking the ability or the will to contribute sufficient value to the
market exchanges upon which productivity and self-sufficiency are
based.9 Their failure is viewed with a mixture of suspicion and
scorn and their need for public assistance clashes with prevailing
economic theories and cultural norms." Those who ,fail to avail
themselves of the opportunities of the marketplace are deemed to
have forfeited their rights to the goods and services it produces.
The tension between these two sets of principles is revealed
most dramatically in the application of the Rule of Law to the poor.
The Rule of Law, as an axiom, does not distinguish between those
who can purchase legal services and those who cannot. On the
contrary, the principles of the Rule of Law as a democratic norm
suggest that all citizens, rich or poor, are beneficiaries of its
5. See Daniel V.A. Olson, Dimensions of Cultural Tension among the American Public,
in CuLTuRAL WARS IN AMERIcAN POLTICs 237, 240 (Rhys H. Williams ed., 1997).
6. ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALisM 41 (1999)
(observing that liberals conceive of liberty as "freedom 'from' interference by other human
agents in one's own pursuits").
7. Cf. WiLLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DE-VALUING OF AMERICA 196 (1992) (describing the
"secret" of the success of Asian-American school children in contrast with African-American
children).
8. Id. at 198-99.
9. GOODIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 42 (offering the failure to contribute that which other
people value as one explanation for the failure to achieve self-sufficiency).
10. See infra notes 275-83, 366-68, and accompanying text.
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actualization.'" But it is also true that the values that flow from
legal justice principles celebrating democracy often clash with the
values of self-sufficiency that look upon reliance on assistance with
disapproval. This tension produces grudging and limited assistance
for the poor who require access to the law. It transforms the Rule
of Law into a rigidly defined welfare benefit or donation which, in
keeping with welfare strategies and principles of charity, is
available only to a limited number of the poor.12
This Article examines the tension between these principles. It
suggests that despite the resonance of the national narrative of
the Rule of Law, this ideal is subordinate to the ideology of self-
sufficiency. For those unable to purchase legal services, and there-
fore forced to resort to public assistance and private charitable aid
to obtain access to the courts, the law is transferred from the sphere
of rights to the. realm of largess. Juridical and constitutional
principles of equal justice under the law clash with cultural and
normative stereotypes of the poor. The manner in which this
tension is resolved suggests that the inability of the poor to be self-
sufficient leads toward forfeiture of the benefits of the Rule of Law.
Although the tension between these principles is constant, it
is also subject to changing political values and economic cir-
cumstances. Policy shifts in response to economic and political
conditions, including cuts to social welfare programs, act to arrest
efforts to ameliorate social inequalities.'" Recent attacks on
institutions that provide legal services to the poor, which have
unfolded within the context of these trends, suggest an increasing
willingness to deny the poor equal access to the law. The success of
the challenges to legal services signifies the triumph of market
11. See infra notes 30-37, 54, and accompanying text.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. See Jeff Faux & Larry Mishel, Inequality and the Global Economy, in GLOBAL
CAPITALISM 96 (Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds., 2000) (suggesting that the pressures
of globalization have reduced domestic concern for safety-net tax and transfer programs);
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575-76 (2000) (explaining that developed countries have
responded to globalization by reducing the social safety net); see also Nand C. Bardouille, The
Transformation of Governance Paradigms and Modalities: Insights into the New
Marketization of the Public Service in Response to Globalization, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'YREV. 155,
157 (2001) (noting that globalization necessitates less government involvement in society and
threatens social safety nets).
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concerns over the promise of the Rule of Law. It reveals that the
cultural dimensions and prevailing attitudes about public and
private largess have entered the national narrative addressing the
Rule of Law for the poor.
This Article focuses on access to the law in civil matters for
which there is no right to counsel. Part I reviews the principle of the
Rule of Law as an ideal with rhetorical import that may exceed its
ability to perform, but notes that it continually shapes national
values and induces the provision of legal services to the poor. Part
I examines the benefits provided by access to the law as well as its
particular significance for the poor whose individual needs for relief
and collective requirement for reform heighten the need for legal
recourse. Part I also reviews historical efforts to meet the legal
needs of the poor through legal services, with law clinics and public
interest law firms serving as complementary measures. 4
Part II examines recent legal events that have diminished
resources by which the poor may access the law. It reviews the
congressional assaults on legal services resulting in funding
reductions and practice restrictions" as well as the constitutional
challenge to these restrictions.16 It also examines the constitutional
challenges to Interest On Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) funding
for legal services,1" political attacks on law school clinical programs,
the unsuccessful litigation to counter these attacks,18 and a recent
Supreme Court decision that has reduced the possibilities for
funding litigation for poor people by narrowing the circumstances
for awarding attorneys' fees in civil rights cases. 19 These events not
only limit the opportunities for the poor to access the law, but also
suggest that the opposition to legal services is driven by powerful
14. "Legal services" here refers to the federally funded national Legal Services
Corporation programs. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (2000).
15. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-50 to 1321-59 [hereinafter OCRAAI.
16. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
17. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
18. See S. Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) v. Supreme Court of La., 252 F.3d
781, 784 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 464 (2001).
19. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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ideological currents seeking to deny equal access to those who fail
to take advantage of market opportunities.
Part III examines the process and implementation of the re-
formulated Rule of Law as a principle of largess. It explores the
mechanisms used to provide law for the poor according to the
structural inequities and the normative biases by which goods and
services are delivered to the needy. It uses the theories of the liberal
welfare state that directly influence welfare programs to under-
stand the view of legal services as a welfare benefit subject to the
same norms that shape welfare programs generally. Part III also
considers the heightened relevance and effect of the principles of
philanthropy on legal services as these services become increasingly
dependent on private contributions. This development suggests that
justice is increasingly a function of charity rather than a right
under the Rule of Law.
Recognizing that current political realities reduce the
possibilities for decommodifying the law and removing it from the
structures of the marketplace, Part IV suggests corrective measures
to expand access to the law. It argues that ongoing efforts are
required to insulate the Rule of Law for the poor from the vagaries
of market forces and shifting political winds. It recommends
reforming existing institutional arrangements with emphasis on
public responsibility for equal access to the law and seeks to
demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of such reforms. Part
IV urges consideration of a civil Gideon ° whereby counsel in civil
cases is a matter of right as opposed to a benefit of largess.
I. THE RULE OF LAW: THE CELEBRATION AND THE SUBSTANCE
A. Eulogizing the Principles of Law
The national celebration of the Rule of Law is historic, with
antecedents that reach deeply into the very origins of the nation.
Its current underpinnings are derived from philosophical inter-
pretations of liberalism giving form to democratic political states.2'
20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing a constitutional right to
counsel in criminal matters).
21. Liberalism here refers to the traditional political philosophy in which the Rule of Law
20021
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Its meaning has been contested and linked either with the rule
of reason or the laws of nature, conceived alternatively as
instrumentality or substance.22 Yet it endures as a collective
concept that constructs a national identity and provides normative
guidance.28 As an ideal and a guarantor of liberty, it establishes a
social contract through which "the Community comes to be Umpire,
by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties
... concerning any matter of right."24 The Rule of Law requires legal
form and more. It entails the substance of fairness as well as the
instruments of impartial enforcement of the law.25
The proposition that legal justice serves as the foundation of
democratic society has been central to the credo around which all
branches of government obtain constitutional function.26 Indeed, the
very Preamble to the Constitution affirms that its central purpose
is to "establish justice."2" Two hundred years later, Supreme Court
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. described the principle of equal
justice under the law as "an immensely moral concept" and "the
cornerstone of our American concept ofjustice."' He observed, "we
have been a legalistic society from the beginning" and have
produced a nation with an "ingrained habit" to go to court and an
"ingrained sense of justice and moral duty" compelling us to frame
important questions of the day as legal problems for the courts to
resolve.29
assumes a prominent place and secures the basis of liberty. See supra note 2.
22. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that Aristotle equated the Rule of Law with
the rule of reason and contrasting his position with those who link it to natural law);
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 791-92 (1989)
(presenting an instrumental and substantive view of the Rule of Law).
23. See Fallon, supra note 22, at 3 (claiming that the Rule of Law is central to national
identity); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALEL.J. 1493,1500-01 (1988) (arguing that
the concept of freedom depends on a government of laws, not people). Michelman observes
that the notion of republicanism relies on the legal order. Id. at 1504-05.
24. LocKE, supra note 2, § 87, at 342.
25. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 238; Fallon, supra note 22, at 9; Eric J. Segall, Justice
Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 995-96
(1994).
26. See infra notes 27-29.
27. U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
28. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Equality Principle: A Foundation of American Law, 20
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 673, 678 (1987).
29. Id. at 675-76.
[Vol. 44:737744
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The importance of the law thus assumes mythical proportions
from which an ongoing national narrative has been derived,
extolling, often exhorting, the promise of equal justice. 0 The
established prescriptive norm includes the resolution of disputes
and remedying of injustices within a legal system that operates
according to just, consistent rules and procedures, and upon which
the core principles of democracy are said to depend. 1 The
instruments and processes of law are understood to serve as the
structures upon which democracy functions. 2 The law is perceived
as "the fabric of our society," protector against governmental
abuses, the excess of the marketplace, and incursions of rights by
other individuals.3" Its very existence and accessibility is presumed
to deter civil unrest.3 ' The judicial system is intimately linked with
concepts of freedom and equality; 5 access to the system is coupled
with notions of fairness that transcend the entire social order. 6
30. See MARK KESSLER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 2 (1987) (suggesting that beliefs
about our system of government are guided by the "myth of rights," which includes the notion
of formal legal equality for all people regardless of wealth or status); Fallon, supra note 22,
at 1 (describing the Rule of Law as a historic ideal that remains rhetorically powerful).
31. Earl Johnson, Jr., Toward Equal Justice: Where The United States Stands Two
Decades Later, 5 MD. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 203 (1994) (noting that equal justice
is at the core of the American system of government); Michelman, supra note 23, at 1493;
Christopher Stone, Crisis In The Legal Profession: Rationing Legal Services for the Poor,
1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 731, 732-33 (claiming that accessing the courts is a constituent
element of a democratic society).
32. See SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT 153 (1990) (noting that classical
democratic theory encompasses citizen participation and reasoned decision making
exemplified in the litigation process).
33. LOCKE, supra note 2, § 123, at 368 (noting that without the Rule of Law, citizens are
exposed to the danger of incursion and violation of their rights by others, rendering them
unsafe and insecure); John McKay, Federally Funded Legal Services: A New Vision of Equal
Justice Under Law, 68 TENN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2000) (describing law as "the fabric of our
society").
34. See McKay, supra note 33, at 103 ("History teaches that social disharmony and
upheaval is inevitable when a significant segment of society is unable to secure meaningful
access to the law and protection under it.").
35. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 238; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803) (noting the government would be one "of laws, and not of men," if it failed to provide
a judicial remedy for every violation of a vested legal right); Ronald H. Silverman, Conceiving
a Lawyer's Legal Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 885,1071 n.388 (1991) ("Freedom and
equality of justice are twin fundamental conceptions of American jurisprudence.").
36. LOCKE, supra note 2, § 136, at 377; see also James W. Meeker & John Dombrink,
Access to the Civil Courts for Those of Low and Moderate Means, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2217,
2218 (1993).
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Nothing less than the full measure of democracy is said to rest on
the principles of the Rule of Law. 7 International human rights and
global standards of equity are identified with the proposition of
enforceable legal rights."
This imagery of justice may transcend the Rule of Law's actual
achievements, but it is also true that the law's existential qualities
are authoritative and impressive. The judicial forum functions by
way of mandates and imperatives. It provides a mechanism to
resolve disputes that affects the interests of individuals and groups
in ways both specific and profound. That the principles of
democracy and the interests of the citizenry are best served by
ensuring access to the courts has been cogently and repeatedly
demonstrated. 9
On a macro level, the legal process provides citizens the
opportunity to engage in judicial and administrative decision-
making activities, and the process of regulating the government
serves to disseminate the normative assumptions upon which legal
ideals are based.' ° Those who engage the law participate in political
life and shape the political discourse, allowing them the opportunity
to construct and reconstruct social dynamics and practices. 1 Insofar
as participation engenders a sense of inclusion and collective
belonging, access to justice serves to promote social integration and
fosters shared trust among those who participate in the system.
The civic confidence derived from the opportunity to contend within
37. See LAWRENCE, supra note 32, at 154-55 (noting that democracy is measured by the
availability of political rights which must include access to the courts).
38. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1833, 1840-41 (2001) (suggesting that concepts of access to the
courts affect international human rights, the enforcement of democratic norms, and the
transition from totalitarian rule to democratic government).
39. See id. at 1916-18 (citing various articulations of access to justice as critical for social
justice and democratic participation); Micheiman, supra note 23, at 1493.
40. Hershkoff, supra note 38, at 1917 (explaining that justiciability affords opportunities
for public decision making); Michelman, supra note 23, at 1501 (claiming that a government
of laws renders legislative politics trustworthy); Rubin, supra note 4, at 772, 781 (noting the
salutary effect of using the legal process to bring citizens into the administrative decision-
making process).
41. See Hershkoff, supra note 38, at 1916 (suggesting that access to the courts provides
entry into political life); Sally E. Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOCYREV. 889,892
(1992) (arguing that court hearings have the potential to be "cultural performances, events
that produce transformations in sociocultural practices and consciousness").
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the bounds of the law creates the social capital by which com-
munities are strengthened and connections between individuals and
groups are reaffirmed and reinforced."2 Moreover, this social capital
may increase if the legal system consistently demonstrates that
such confidence is justified."
The judicial system also works in more immediate and direct
ways. It protects individual rights and determines fundamental
issues relating to life, liberty, and property. It resolves a range of
conflicts in those realms that affect all facets of public and private
life. In other words, in all matters that are central to the credo by
which vast numbers of people presume to order their daily lives,
citizens must ultimately appeal to the Rule of Law as a guarantee
of their inalienable rights.
The existence of rights and legal protection alone, however, is
inadequate to give effect to the principles of the Rule of Law. Laws
are not self-enforcing but instead require aggrieved parties to
advance their claims for resolution in order to provide form and
content to the concept of legal rights." Rights must be "secured
by structural and substantive constraints, such as ... legally
enforceable claims by individuals." 5 It is through the legal process
of adjudication that routine claims and constitutional challenges of
national import may be alchemized into widely venerated principles
of law.
The mechanisms by which individual issues are translated and
social problems are transformed into legal claims are complex and
require specialized skills." Procedural requirements are technical
42. See Eric K Yamamoto, Court and the Cultural Performance: Native Hawaiians'
Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994) (suggesting
that court processes allow people to connect with larger social movements).
43. Cf GOODIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 31 (noting that the social capital produced by
policies that promote social integration is likely to expand with use).
44. Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 880 (2001)
("Rights do not enforce themselves. They require judicial decisions interpreting and enforcing
their terms."); see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1193 (2000) (noting
that the system requires individuals with grievances to come forward for any possibility of
redress or reform).
45. Rubin, supra note 4, at 727.
46. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR 43 (1991) (describing the legal
process as a "host of rules of substance and procedure" requiring the skills of a lawyer)
(quoting HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 234 (1988)).
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and often bar access to the courts . 7 The substance of the law,
particularly when expressed in statutory and regulatory language,
is often obscure and unintelligible." Moreover, the law is not static
but rather it adapts and adjusts to give legal expression to
prevailing social values and cultural norms. Those who would make
effective use of the law must stay abreast of the shifting nuances of
legal developments and emerging theories. In this legalistic society,
where "[sicarcely any political question arises ... that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question,]" access to the
courts is often impossible without the use of lawyers.' 9
Lawyers are necessary in order to facilitate the transformation
of an individual dispute or social condition to a legal claim suitable
for resolution.' They assist in navigating the complexities involved
in presenting the cases in court. In addition to the traditional role
of representing clients at the trial level, lawyers possess the
necessary skills to advance their clients' broad judicial agendas and
contribute to the shaping of legal policy, particularly through
appellate litigation.5 Indeed, one task of a lawyer is to test and
improve the law through debate within the scrutiny of the courts.
Lawyers are also required in settings outside of the courtroom.
Legal principles are not simply confined to law suits; they have
applicability in administrative agency enforcement, rulemaking
and adjudicative proceedings, before legislative bodies, in trans-
actional matters, and in private relationships that go beyond the
scope of public institutional processes. Legal representation assures
47. Cross, supra note 44, at 884 (arguing that procedural requirements "can result in
social reform groups being unable to present their best arguments, or even have their day
in court") (quoting GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 12 (1991)).
48. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 2 (2000) (noting that for most people the justice system seems "unwieldy,
unintelligible, and unaffordable"); Brennan, supra note 28, at 675-76 (describing the
intricacies of statutory language and common law rules). During the oral argument in INS
v. St. Cyr, one of the Justices referred to a statutory and regulatory immigration provision
as a "brain teaser." Record at 15, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00-767), 2000 WL
469077, at *16.
49. ALEXISDETOCQUEVILLE,DEMOCRACYINAMERICA 280 (Everyman's Library ed. 1994).
50. SMITH, supra note 46, at 43-44 (suggesting that because of the complexity of the
process, lawyers determine who gains access to the judicial system).
51. See LAWRENCE, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that through litigation, lawyers and their
clients bring select items of national concern to the courts' attention).
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adequate interaction between citizens and decision makers and
the proper distribution of information likely to contribute to a
more responsive political and administrative state.52 A lawyer's
familiarity with both legal substance and the structure of the law
confers a benefit upon those engaged in a broad spectrum of
activities associated with the law.
B. Principles of Law and the Poor
The premium derived from opportunities to enforce legal rights
may be categorized as a public good that confers benefits on all
members of society.' But the celebration of legal principles as the
foundation of a democratic society must take particular measure of
the degree to which the poor and the powerless are included as
beneficiaries. To deny the poor access to the courts because of
economic constraints would represent an egregious failure of due
process and a repudiation of democratic principles of civilized
society. 4 In light of this fact, de Tocqueville's proposition that all
political questions eventually become legal concerns assumes a
heightened significance for the poor, whose conditions of poverty
often raise the most serious political issues, and thus eventual
justiciable controversies, of the day.5 The benefits of the courts are
especially important for the poor who lack the political means to
52. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 713-15, 775-76 (arguing that the administrative state
embodies the political commitments of our society, and thus interaction with the
administrative structure to improve democratic functions is critical); see also Diller, supra
note 44, at 1190 (noting the importance of the admini trative process and the need to achieve
agency accountability through rule-based mechanisms and legal procedures).
53. See William R. Mureiko, A Public Goods Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees
Under Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 438, 452 (arguing that enforcement
of civil rights laws for the poor works a public good by conveying psychological as well as
actual benefits to other members of society and improving quality of life generally).
54. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS INCOMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 198 (1998) ("[I]fonly the wealthy, or only large private
business corporations, have the organizational and financial capacity to mobilize
constitutional law in their favor, then judicial policy making in the area of constitutional
rights is likely to be undemocratic in the extreme."); see also LIMAN, supra note 3, at 214.
55. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 49, at 280; see also RUSSELL GALLOWAY, JUSTICE FOR
ALL?THE RICHANDPOORIN SUPREME COURTHISTRY, 1790-1990, at 8 (1991) ("[Tlhe political
and economic tension between the rich and the poor accounts for what is widely regarded as
the most fundamental of all political issues.... [which] tend sooner or later to become judicial
controversies ....").
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defend their social and economic rights.5 6 In a larger sense, the
judicial system is the primary setting to challenge social conditions
that bear oppressively on those without means. The poor may use
legal strategies to reframe political, social, and economic issues
according to their needs.57 This process challenges the dominant
narratives that limit society's understanding of its circumstances.5 8
Indeed, the judiciary itself has recognized the necessity of legal
strategies as a means by which the courts remain informed and
receptive to the possibility of reallocating legal rights for the poor. 9
Citizens without financial resources experience the lack of legal
protection and the failure to enforce individual rights in an
aggravated fashion; in fact, their legal needs are often derived
specifically from their vulnerable status as it relates to poverty. 60 As
Joel Handler observed, "it seems self-evident that the poor,
minorities, the poorly educated, the newcomer, the frightened, the
mentally ill, the sick, and other disadvantaged are ... more likely to
suffer distress and injustice than those better off .. .l The issues
for which the poor seek legal redress involve essential human
needs: housing, income maintenance and basic subsistence, govern-
ment and private benefits, including unemployment compensation
and disability payments, access to health care, child support, and
education. 62 The elderly poor who live on fixed incomes are more
56. Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401, 1428
(1995) (noting that the poor must rely on lawyers because litigation remains a vehicle for
obtaining social change despite its lack of a political power base); see also Rubin, supra note
4, at 742-43 (commenting that those who are marginalized may be excluded from exercising
political interests).
57. Yamamoto, supra note 42, at 6 (suggesting that by helping litigants to develop and
define their present claims the legal system has value without regard to the outcome in
court).
58. See id.
59. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (acknowledging that
legal services attorneys representing the poor must be able to present a full range of legal
arguments about the contested issues in order to have an informed and independent
judiciary).
60. See Silverman, supra note 35, at 900-01 (reporting on the New York City Marrero
Committee's findings that access to legal services may involve the essentials of life, making
representation more vital for the poor than middle-class citizens).
61. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BUREAUCRACY 24 (1986).
62. Silverman, supra note 35, at 900-01 (citing the Marrero Report); see also Jeannie
Costello, Note, Who Has the Ear of the King: The Crisis in Legal Services, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
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likely to fall victim to consumer fraud and predatory lending
practices than people with stable and sufficient income.63 Poor
people who live in publicly subsidized housing and those who
receive food stamps or cash public benefits, are subject to a myriad
of governmental regulations. As a result, they often need legal
intervention to guarantee the proper enforcement of regulations
and statutes governing these programs."' When rights are violated,
the poor must challenge the very agencies upon which they depend
for assistance through an elaborate regulatory process. Their
challenges are further complicated by a bureaucracy that serves to
conceal both wrongs and remedies.6 5
While those without financial means are often more likely to
experience acute legal needs, they are also less likely to possess the
resources to negotiate the complex processes of civil litigation. The
capacity of the poor to exercise their legal rights is undermined by
power relationships affecting the law." Poverty is more than an
economic condition, it is also a social circumstance that acts to
isolate communities and weaken support systems.67 Poverty limits
mobility and threatens individual health and collective well-being.
Simply put, a lack of resources reduces the possibilities for
enforcing one's rights.6 8 Poor citizens' limited access to legal
REV. 655 (1990) (arguing that access to the courts for the poor involves "the very basics of
life").
63. McKay, supra note 33, at 104 (discussing the need for legal services amongst elderly
homeowners who are victims of illegal equity-stripping schemes).
64. Rubin, supra note 4, at 771 (noting the growth of governmental functions at the
administrative level results in heightened interactions between citizens and administrators).
65. HANDLER, supra note 61, at 23-24 (discussing the various factors within the
administrative state which prevent the recognition of legal harms, including the actions of
decision makers and the prevailing ideology which discourages exercising rights).
66. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1411-12 (1996) (noting that legal
scholars from both the post-Chicago School of Law and Economics and outsider scholarship,
including critical race theory, radical feminist theory, and gay legal studies, agree that the
law is deeply influenced by power relationships).
67. Edgar S. Calm, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2133,2135 (1994) (describing
poverty as "isolation, (a] lack of access to resources and support systems").
68. Joel F. Handler, 'Constructing the Political Spectacle': The Interpretation of
Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899,
971 (1990) (observing that the ability to appropriate rights depends on empowerment;
whether one has the ability to control one's environment, a sense of power, and group
identification).
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remedies has been characterized as "a crisis ... which jeopardizes
both the welfare of poor persons and the legitimacy of the legal
system itself."9 The magnitude of this crisis has been described as
catastrophic.70
The poor seek parity with the wealthy in the range of legal
projects and lawyering strategies undertaken on their behalf.
Lawyers for wealthy clients pursue economic and power advan-
tages by "imaginatively engineering important resource gains and
redistributions on their behalf."71 Business lawyers have been
particularly successful in their efforts to obtain economic advan-
tages for their clients.7 The poor deserve no less from their lawyers
and the legal system. They too seek reallocation of rights and an
equitable distribution of resources. They too require sufficient
advocacy to untangle the complexities of their legal problems in all
venues. They too deserve lawyers who can resort to a range of
strategies to efficiently address their rights, including securing
advantages through sophisticated and repeated efforts in the legal
system."
C. A Historical Perspective-Providing Law for the Poor
The national narrative extolling the principles of the Rule of
Law has served as a rationale for the long-standing efforts to supply
lawyers to the poor. The history of these efforts has been recounted
in numerous scholarly works, and legal services organizations have
been the mainstay for meeting the legal needs of the poor.74 Public
69. Victor Marrero, Committee to Improve TheAvailability ofLegalServices-FinalReport
to the Chief Judge Of the State Of New York, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 772 (1990).
70. See Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer's Duty of Public Service:
More Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 367, 374 (Winter 1993-94) (stating that the "failure
of the poor to receive needed legal services can only be considered catastrophic"); Esther F.
Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49
MD. L. REV. 78, 86 n.22 (1990).
71. Silverman, supra note 35, at 1071.
72. Id.
73. Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves* Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC'v REV. 95, 98-101 (1974) (arguing that repeat players who frequently
use the courts are better off than those who use the courts infrequently).
74. For a history of legal services to the poor, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED:
LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); EARL JOHNSON, JUSTICE
AND REFORM (1978); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982); KESSLER,
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interest law firms and law school clinics complement these
programs, by providing additional resources to the poor.75
1. Legal Aid/Legal Services
Legal services to the poor originated in the late-nineteenth
and mid-twentieth centuries with the development of legal aid
societies, which were supported principally by charities.76 The
initial founders of these organizations sought to assist newly freed
slaves, immigrants, children, and women, and expected legal aid
to challenge the exploitive economic arrangements of the day.1
7
Those concerned with using the law for social and economic
justice were soon replaced, however, by wealthy donors and
powerful members of the bar whose conception of legal aid was
comparatively restrained.7 ' By the 1920s, the scope of legal aid
societies was limited to routine and restricted services provided in
a desultory fashion. 79 Although some legal aid advocates argued for
a stable, federally funded program, they found themselves accused
of Communist sympathies and of fomenting a threatening
propaganda campaign to socialize the legal profession.'0 The
number of charitably supported legal aid societies continued to
grow, in part as a hedge against the prospect of government funded
supra note 30; LAWRENCE, supra note 32; SMITH, supra note 46; Alan W. Houseman, Civil
Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L.
& PoLYREV. 369 (1998)[hereinafter Houseman, Civil LegalAssistance]; Alan W. Houseman,
Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor-A Commentary, 83 GEO. L.J. 1669 (1995)
[hereinafter Houseman, Political Lessons]; Joan Mahoney, Green Forms and Legal Aid
Offices: A History of Publicly Funded Legal Services in Britain and the United States, 17 ST.
LoUIs U. PUB. L. REv. 223 (1998). The National Equal Justice Library maintains archival
materials and historical information related to legal services for the poor. See Bibliography
to the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-income Persons: Professional and
Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2731 (1999).
75. See HANDLER, supra note 61, at 27.
76. Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 70, at 369.
77. Id.
78. KA72, supra note 74, at 7 (describing early legal aid concerns as relating to class
oppression, which shifted to perfunctory representation, following the transfer of power from
the initial founders to charities and elite lawyers).
79. Id.; Houseman, Political Lessons, supra note 74, at 1671.
80. See KESSLER, supra note 30, at 5-6 (recounting the National Lawyers'Guild's demand
in the mid-1930s for a federally subsidized legal services program and the resulting attack
upon them).
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programs; however, they remained underfunded and subject to
external political and ideological influences.8'
From 1964 through 1967, Congress funded a number of social
programs through legislation associated with Great Society
programs, including legal services as part of the War on Poverty
under the auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). s2
The structure of the new legal services program was influenced by
legal scholars and activist practitioners whose conception of legal
services was linked to a comprehensive antipoverty strategy.83
Stable and adequate federal funding was viewed as the bedrock
principle of the new program." But the revised approach to legal
services for the poor involved more than increased financial
support. The architects of the OEO legal services programs
championed new legal and social impact strategies as a means to
cure the ills of poverty.85 Through law reform efforts and
programmatic connections to the community, the law was intended
to correct injustices and bring about social change. 6
OEO-funded "legal services" represented a sharp break with the
traditional "legal aid" societies. 7 OEO-funded legal advocacy was
more aggressive and lawyers used litigation of individual cases,
including appellate strategies, in conjunction with lobbying and
81. See Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 70, at 369 (attributing the increase in
charitably-funded legal aid to the fear of socialization of legal services for the poor);
Houseman, Political Lessons, supra note 74, at 1671; see also Eldred & Schoenherr, supra
note 70, at 370 (noting that charitable donations were insufficient to meet the needs of more
than one percent of the poor); Michael Givel, Legal Aid to the Poor: What the National
Delivery System Has and Has Not Been Doing, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.REV. 369, 370 (1998);
Robert J. Rhudy, Comparing Legal Services to the Poor in the United States with Other
Western Countries: Some Preliminary Lessons, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 223, 230
(1994) (noting that fiscal constraints require programs to limit their work to individual cases
and to avoid major litigation).
82. See Cahn, supra note 67, at 2135; Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on
Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
83. See Calm & Calm, supra note 82.
84. See id.
85. See Houseman, Political Lessons, supra note 74, at 1672 (quoting the U.S. Attorney
General's comments on the need for a reformed legal services organization to serve the poor).
86. Id. at 1672-73.
87. See KATZ, supra note 74, at 13 (noting the contention over the term "Legal Aid" as "a
disgraced reminder of the traditional view that legal assistance for the poor was a charitable
gift, not a legal obligation of the state and a personal right of the poor").
754 [Vol. 44:737
20021 LAW AS LARGESS 755
organizing strategies, to reallocate rights and change relationships
between the rich and the poor."
But success aroused suspicion. As OEO programs opened
neighborhood offices and represented community groups and
individuals, they became vulnerable to political attacks and
controversy.89 Indeed, conflicts about the ideological impetus of the
program originated from many sources, including local and national
bar associations seeking to control legal services funding.90 Political
opposition mounted and Congress imposed restrictions related to
political activity, union organizing, and cases involving reproductive
rights.91 Low income eligibility requirements further limited
representation to only the very poorest of clients.92
As the OEO program expanded and political opposition
increased, state legislatures and Congress attempted to control the
relationship between the law and the poor by terminating or
otherwise eviscerating federally funded legal services.93 Legal
88. See Mahoney, supra note 74, at 236 (observing that legal services used routine cases
in an effort to: (1) change the legal relationship between the poor and their landlords, the
government, and their creditors; (2) broaden the rights of the poor to access the courts; and
(3) supplement courtroom strategies with lobbying and organizing tactics); Rhudy, supra note
81, at 232 (noting the development of a new body of poverty law as a result of strategies used
by the OEO legal services programs).
89. See KATZ, supra note 74, at 68, 78 (stating that the representation of community
groups was one of the most controversial activities undertaken by the new programs).
90. See id. at 7 (describing the struggle of Chicago's legal services programs to remain
independent from the city's Democratic political machine); Houseman, Political Lessons,
supra note 74, at 1678-79 (describing legal services opposition as fearful of competition and
concerned that lawyers' obligations would arise out of federal subsidies to the profession);
Mahoney, supra note 74, at 234 (noting the early opposition of the American Bar Association
due to concerns about the actions of legal services attorneys).
91. See James D. Lorenz, Jr., Almost the Last Word on Legal Services: Congress can do
Pretty Much What it Likes, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 295, 302-03 (1998) (noting draft
restrictions related to political opposition to the Vietnam war, union prohibitions resulting
from the fear of the growing support for the farmworkers' grape boycott, and abortion
restrictions, all came in the wake of the polarizing decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959
(1973)).
92. See Mahoney, supra note 74, at 235 (noting that the eligibility guidelines eliminated
the possibility of representing the working or lower middle classes).
93. See KESSLER, supra note 30, at 7 (noting congressional efforts to restrict program
activities following successful legal services law suits against government entities and
explaining state opposition to the establishment or continuance of federally funded programs
in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, and New
Mexico). Even cities that felt threatened by legal services advocacy attempted to influence
the programs. Id.
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services advocates responded to political attacks by urging the
establishment of a permanent and autonomous legal services
organization, hoping to shield the program from political inter-
ference. After protracted negotiations, Congress passed the Legal
Services Corporation (LSC) Act in 1974. The Act established a
quasi-governmental agency designed to receive and distribute
federal funds, regulate legal services programs, and modify the
programs' agenda by removing law reform strategies as priorities
of the organization.9 4 Many expected that the passage of this Act
would create a stable institution that could function within one
branch of government while remaining free from the shifting
political whims of the others.
But controversy and opposition to legal services for the poor
continued. Despite efforts to shield legal services programs from the
winds of political change, funding levels for legal services programs
have fluctuated over the last twenty years depending on the
political fortunes of their friends and foes. During the 1970s, the
programs enjoyed relative stability and increased financial support.
By the early 1980s, however, they faced drastic financial cuts and
repeated efforts to eliminate the program completely, only to
recover during the late 1980s and the mid-1990s.95 Beginning in
1994, the programs experienced the most serious attacks, resulting
in a debilitating loss of funding and the imposition of substantive
and procedural restraints on programming efforts." As a result of
the funding cuts, legal services programs were obliged to once again
depend on charitable contributions and grants.97 The structural
links to client communities and the emphasis on law reform
strategies associated with programs of the Great Society are faded
memories which now appear to be an anomaly in the history of legal
services programs.
94. Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (2000)); see also LAWRENCE, supra note 32, at 12, 36;
Rhudy, supra note S1, at 234 n.51.
95. KESSLER, supra note 30, at 8-10.
96. OCRAA §§ 501-509; KESSLER, supra note 30, at 9; Rhudy, supra note 81, at 235; see
infra notes 150-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1995 legal services
restrictions.
97. Lorenz, supra note 91, at 313-14 (describing the necessary fundraising efforts by legal
services programs from various charitable and granting sources).
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2. Complementary Mechanisms
Public interest law firms and law school clinics are part of the
history of legal services for the poor. Public interest law groups
have existed since at least 1916 when the American Union Against
Militarism was formed.98 In 1939, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) established the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund.9 Other public interest organi-
zations followed, including the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights
under Law (1963), the Environmental Defense Fund (1967), and the
Center for Law and Social Policy (1968).100 These organizations
have sought to accomplish poverty law reform and to achieve civil
rights and civil liberties for the underrepresented, including poor
workers and labor organizers, juveniles, prisoners, and freedom
riders.101
Law school clinical programs were organized during the 1930s
and 1940s and had developed into a model for teaching and service
by the 1950s.1 °2 By the late 1970s, law school clinical programs "had
arrived.""0 3 Clinical programs have long been influenced by the legal
services movement and have consistently identified the delivery of
legal services to the poor as the centerpiece of their purpose. 1 4 The
link between the pedagogical and social justice purposes of clinics
98. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALEL.J. 1415, 1439-40 (1984) (tracing
the roots of public interest practice in this country).
99. Id. at 1441.
100. Id. at 144143.
101. See Anita P. Arriola & Sidney M. Wolinsky, Public Interest Practice in Practice: The
Law and Reality, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1207 (1983) (describing the public interest law firm's
focus on issues primarily concerning the poor and underrepresented); David R. Esquivel, The
Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 327, 336-40 (1996) (describing early
developments in the public interest law movement and the expansion of groups providing
services in a number of substantive areas, including environmental protection, consumer
protection, employment rights, mental health rights, rights of gay, lesbian, and bisexual
persons, and children); Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance, supra note 74, at 369 n.3 (noting
that there have always been other providers of legal services to the poor that were not funded
by LSC, including civil rights and civil liberties organizations).
102. See Douglas A. Blaze, Deja Vu All Over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of Clinical
Education, 64 TENN. L. REv. 939, 939-42 (1997) (reviewing the origins of clinical legal
education).
103. Id. at 942.
104. Id. at 944.
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is often mediated by law student practice rules, many of which
restrict clinical representation to indigent clients only.
10 5
II. DIMINISHING RESOURCES OF LAW FOR THE POOR: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Despite the national rhetoric of equal justice and the tradition
of concern about legal access for the poor, recent legal developments
have decreased funding for lawyers for the poor, narrowed the
categories of people eligible to receive free legal assistance, and
curtailed the scope of available services.'0 6 These measures have
undermined the principles of equal justice and must be understood
in the context of the changing tides of the political economy. The
decrease in legal resources for the poor has occurred at a time of
renewed laissez-faire economic policies and increased political
influence by corporate interests. 10 7 These policies have widened
disparities of wealth, which are tolerated as an acceptable trade-off
for overall economic growth. 08 This has been a period distinguished
by an ideological shift that seeks to reduce government inter-
vention; concerns about global competition have also had a
withering effect on the welfare state, labor unions, and wages.10 9
105. See David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical
Supervisor, 51 S.M.U. L. REV. 1507, 1515-16 n.28 (1998) (noting that most student practice
rules limit student representation to indigent persons).
106. See, e.g., OCRAA §§ 501-509.
107. Faux & Mishel, supra note 13, at 108 (noting "a shift in domestic political power in
favour of the owners of capital"); see also Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform: A Quarter
Century Later, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID 33 (Francis Regan et al. eds., 1999)
(noting the link between the assault on legal services and the influence of major private
donors who influence politicians through campaign contributions); John Kilwein, The Decline
of the Legal Services Corporation, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID, supra, at 41
(describing a shift in the 1990s in which both Democratic and Republican leaders favored a
focus on retrenchment, including cutting taxes and shifting power to the markets).
108. Faux & Mishel, supra note 13, at 95, 101-02 (noting that in the mid-1960s, the salary
ratio of top CEOs to the average worker was 39 to 1; however by 1997 it skyrocketed to 254
to 1).
109. See id. at 101; Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens, Preface to GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra
note 13, at viii-ix. The environment of global competition has resulted in the inability of
domestic systems to provide sufficient income maintenance, health care, and education
benefits to the poor. Id. at 108; see also Robert Kuttner, The Role of Governments in the
Global Society, in GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 147-48 (noting enormous mergers
on a global scale).
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The reduction of welfare programs generally is part of a larger
process in which the defense of global economic interests demands
"one true path to the efficient allocation of goods and services....
[which] includes, above all, the dismantling of barriers to free
commerce and the free flows of financial capital.""0 These interests
have successfully pushed for the election of officials with similar
ideology to carry out their goal of redefining the role of government
to assist in a laissez-faire economy."' They have also operated
through conservative organizations committed to the protection of
property rights and the limitations of government intervention.
112
They have influenced national policy, including legal policy, through
aggressive litigation strategies in order to strengthen free market
enterprise."'
This shift has been difficult to counter. A void has been created
in the climate of global economy and laissez-faire policies, making
it increasingly difficult to respond to these circumstances." 4 Many
people who do not achieve economic success nevertheless assimilate
the values and attitudes of the market and conclude that their
economic distress is of their own making. This reflects a long
tradition of depoliticizing issues of poverty. "' The reinvigoration of
private market concerns has similarly reactivated the perception
that the status of the poor is related to personal failures and
defects.
Legal services programs are situated in the vortex of these
political and economic changes. Most notably in 1995, LSC came
under attack by conservative politicians eager to "reinstat[e] the
proper limits for government" and reduce government subsidies for
110. Kuttner, supra note 109, at 149.
111. Id. at 149-50 (noting that wealthy corporations have actively supported the election
of those with similar views to reduce the government's regulatory role and to limit it to
assisting the laissez-faire agenda).
112. Id. (noting efforts of large corporations to sway policy and to influence business-
created entities carrying out regulatory roles despite their lack of democratic accountability);
see infra notes 123, 178, 183-85, 216, 234, 362, and accompanying text.
113. See Kuttner, supra note 109, at 149-50.
114. See id. at 155. Workers concerned that their jobs will be transferred abroad accept
lower wages and fewer people vote. Faux & Mishel, supra note 13, at 103.
115. See Kuttner, supra note 109, at 155. Kuttner suggests a slogan for the new economy:
"Anyone can be Bill Gates, and if you're not Bill Gates it's your own fault." Id.
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the poor.1 ' Congress reduced the funds to LSC by one-third,
imposed new restrictions on the range of work the programs could
undertake, and limited the clients it could represent." 7 At the same
time, a conservative legal policy foundation dedicated to "advocating
free-enterprise principles, responsible government, and property
rights""' successfully challenged the constitutionality of IOLTA. 9
For many legal services programs IOLTA is the second largest
revenue stream, so the threat to this source of funding could have
dire consequences.
In addition to legal services, political and business interests,
angered by what they considered to be interference by a law school
clinic with their efforts to locate industry in Louisiana, successfully
challenged the ability of clinical law programs to represent poor
communities."2 This attack on law clinics resulted in diminished
access to legal services for the poor in Louisiana and may portend
diminished possibilities for law clinics elsewhere.' 2'
Public interest law firms that rely on attorney's fee awards to
make it economically feasible to represent poor victims of civil
rights deprivations have been jeopardized by the recent decision
in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources. 22 In Buckhannon,
the Supreme Court pushed the pendulum further toward a
reinvigorated "American" rule whereby each party bears its own
attorney's fees. This decision limited the possibilities for funding
116. Kilwein, supra note 107, at 61 (quoting the manifesto of the Conservative Action
Team, a group of conservative House Republicans whose goals included the elimination of
LSC).
117. Id.
118. Washington Legal Foundation, Mission Statement, at http'Jtwww.wif.org/resources/
WLFMission/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2000). More fully, the Washington Legal Foundation
describes its mission as "advocating free-enterprise principles, responsible government,
property rights, a strong national security and defense, and balanced civil and criminal
justice system." Id. The Foundation further asserts that it "has shaped public policy through
aggressive litigation.... to strengthen America's free enterprise system." Id.
119. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
120. See SCLC v. Supreme Court ofLa., 252 F.3d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 464 (2001).
121. See id.
122. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
[Vol. 44:737760
LAW AS LARGESS
litigation for poor people by narrowing the circumstances in which
attorney's fees may be awarded in civil rights matters. 2 '
It may not be surprising that the shift in economic and political
policies has influenced the provision of the law to the poor. But
there has been little acknowledgment of the ways these changes
have disturbed the national narrative about the prominence of the
Rule of Law. Legal resources for the poor have been cast as
tentative and problematic. The proposition of equal access to the
law currently appears as something less than a guiding principle
of democratic process. An examination of recent developments
demonstrates a widening gap between those who have access to the
law and those who do not, and the transformation of law for the
poor from democratic principles to contingent possibilities yielding
to prevailing norms of self-sufficiency and related principles of
largess.
A. The Assault on Legal Services
1. Congressional Restrictions
In 1995, foes of federally funded legal services mounted the most
serious assault in the history of the LSC, aimed at its complete
abolishment.'2 The campaign began with the 104th Congress and
continued unabated for the next three years.1" Congress provided
a venue for more diatribe than debate, and ultimately a narrative
about law for the poor emerged that all but eviscerated the notion
of equal justice for all.' The themes reverberating during this
123. See id.; infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
124. See 141 CONG. REc. 16,994 (1995) (statement of Sen. Helms) (proposing the
elimination of all funding to LSC); BRENNAN CENTER FORJUSTICE, INST. NO. 3, AN UNSOLVED
MYSTERY: WHY ARE ROGUE POLITICIANS TRYING TO KILL A PROGRAM THAT HELPS THEIR
NEEDIEST CONSTITUENTS? 2(2000) [hereinafter AN UNSOLVED MYSTERY] (noting that in 1995,
twenty-seven conservative members of Congress wrote to then-House Speaker Newt
Gingrich asking that LSC be abolished).
125. See 141 CONG. REc. 16,994 (1995) (statement of Sen. Helms) (launching the assault
on the LSC).
126. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text; infra notes 128-31 and accompanying
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period celebrated laissez-faire economics, free market relationships,
and minimal government intervention in human affairs.'27
The issues were framed largely by opponents of the program
motivated more by ideological objectives than budgetary con-
straints. 128 Conservative members of Congress argued that legal
services ranked "at or near the bottom" of funding priorities and
questioned whether it was the responsibility of the government to
fund law for the poor at all."2 Characterizing LSC as "[big
Government legal services," 30 and a "government bureaucracy ...
out of control ... [which] must be tamed," opponents advocated a
return to charitable programs or alternatively suggested that
market-driven private legal services could provide low-cost aid to
the poor.131
Using a strategy described as "argumentative bludgeoning,"'
3 2
critics denounced legal services for seeking the destruction of
legitimate businesses and small farmers. 3 3 LSC was charged with
assisting undeserving poor people, and criticized for "taking money
away from law-abiding, hard-working taxpayers and then giving it
to the likes of convicted felons, delinquent fathers, illegal aliens,
and even to drug dealers."3 4 Lobbying efforts by legal services
127. See Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 52 (1995) (noting
the association with laissez-faire economics and that this period ofcongressional activity was
dominated by the Republican Party platform known as "The Contract With America").
128. 141 CONG. REC. 16,994 (1995) (statement of Sen. Helms) ("Should Congress continue
to force the American taxpayers to provide $400 million every year to pay the salaries of, and
otherwise fund, a cadre of liberal lawyers to push their social policies down the throats of
local governments and citizens?'); id. at 15,464 (statement of Rep. McCollum) (accusing LSC
of engaging in "impact litigation in an attempt to socially engineer change in our laws and
rules").
129. 142 CONG. REC. 18,630 (1996) (statement of Rep. Doolittle).
130. Id. at 18,626 (statement of Rep. Taylor).
131. Id. at 18,627 (statement of Rep. Ballenger) (noting the existence of "sufficient private
alternatives").
132. Steven Lukes, Cultural Relativism and Liberal Principles, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 5, 2001, at 19 (describing philosopher Robert Nozick's term for
manipulative argument).
133. See 141 CONG. REC. 16,994 (1995) (statement of Sen. Helms) (accusing legal services
ofunmercifully harass[ing] law-abiding citizens ... hapless small businessmen, farmers, and
so forth").
134. 142 CoNG. REc. 18,626 (1996) (statement of Rep. Taylor); see also id. at 18,633
(statement of Rep. Dornan); AN UNSOLVED MYSTERY, supra note 124, at 4 (describing
accusations by Representative Steve Largent who, in 1995, accused legal services of
protecting drug dealers from eviction from housing projects and helping fathers to avoid
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attorneys were deemed unrelated to the needs of the poor and
beyond the array of services to which the poor were entitled, even
if funded by private sources."5 LSC was characterized as arrogant
and corrupt, a hotbed of government mismanagement; its lawyers
were portrayed as duplicitous and dishonest for evading statutory
and regulatory program limitations. 3 '
Congressional opponents relied largely on unspecified anecdotes,
often provided by conservative activists, and frequently lacking any
documentation to corroborate their claims." 7 Although the
arguments exceeded the evidence and the charges against legal
services were frequently disproved, the smear campaign continued
to fuel the invective against LSC funding. 38 For example, the
failure to include information about the overlap of domestic violence
issues in divorce cases allowed opponents to manipulate financial
statistics and distort LSC programmatic expenditures in an
attempt to depict legal services as antifamily.l"9 Statements were
incorrectly attributed to LSC lawyers, suggesting an intent to evade
paying child support).
135. 142 CONG. REc. 15,464 (1996) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (describing the intent
of Congress in funding legal services as relating to the "legal system" and as excluding any
lobbying activity as inappropriate).
136. Id. at 18,633 (statement of Rep. Dornan) (calling LSC "arrogant and corrupt" and
accusing LSC of "exacerbat[ing] illegal immigration"); id. at 18,639 (statement of Rep.
Radanovich) (calling LSC "a portrait of Government mismanagement"); id. at 18,627
(statement of Rep. Burton) (accusing LSC lawyers of "getting around the restrictions so they
can do whatever they damn well please').
137. See 141 CONG. REC. 16,994 (1996) (statement of Sen. Helms) (relying on information
provided by Heritage Foundation publications supporting budget cuts to welfare, and an
editorial by the president of the Washington-based Institute for Justice suggesting that
welfare reform would be impossible to accomplish without first fighting LSC). The National
Legal and Policy Center, a conservative organization funded in large part by conservative
foundations such as the Sarah Scaife Foundation, the Carthage Foundation, and the John
M. Olin Foundation, was active in congressional hearings and targeted congressional
supporters of legal services. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, INST. NO. 7, HIDDEN
AGENDAS: WHAT IS REALLY BEHIND AiTrACKS ON LEGAL AID LAWYERS? 11-12 (2001)
[hereinafter HIDDEN AGENDAS).
138. See Alexander D. Forger, Address: The Future of Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 333, 339 (1998) (noting that in legislative debates "[ijf you're against legal services, you
say whatever you want; that's ok. You can even make up quotes.... You say what you want
to say-black is white or red-and you pass around all of the long ago discredited stories").
139. See HIDDEN AGENDAS, supra note 137, at 15 (describing then-Christian Coalition
Director Ralph Reed's accusation that legal services used excessive expenditures in divorce
cases).
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federal restrictions.' 40 Opponents claimed legal services programs
contributed to the destruction of the economy.1'1 LSC was char-
acterized as a bully funded by hard-earned tax dollars that
"unmercifully harassed law-abiding citizens. "1 42 Its critics called for
its "quiet funeral."43
The most pointed attacks denounced legal services for
attempting to undermine congressional efforts to limit the govern-
ment by reforming welfare while reinvigorating principles of
personal responsibility.1" Indeed, the linkage between the
campaign to dismantle welfare and the determination to disable
legal services repeatedly surfaced during the legislative debates. 1
45
Programs were accused of using taxpayer money to undermine local
government policies related to eliminating entitlement programs. 46
Welfare challenges based on constitutional theory were character-
ized as "legal sleights of hand,"147 and "arrogant absurdit[iesl,"
orchestrated by "a cadre of liberal lawyers [who] push their social
140. See 142 CONG. REc. 18,628 (1996) (statement of Rep. Burton) (urging an end to legal
services and misattributing a statement to an LSC lawyer that allegedly evinced an intent
to evade the restrictions). Representative Burton also wrongfully accused programs in
Philadelphia and California of evading restrictions on welfare reform litigation. See id.
(statement of Rep. Burton). One congressman pointed out that "the facts show[ed]" that
Representative Burton had misattributed the statement to an LSC program. Id. at 18,628
(statement of Rep. Fox). Another representative agreed that Representative Burton had
made erroneous accusations. Id. at 18,635 (statement of Rep. Lofgren). Although advised of
his error, Representative Burton continued to misattribute these statements to LSC
programs. I& at 18,640 (statement of Rep. Burton).
141. Id. at 18,630 (statement of Rep. Doolittle) (arguing that LSC programs are
"destroying our economic growth").
142. 141 CONG. REC. 16,994 (1995) (statement of Sen. Helms).
143. Id. (statement of Sen. Helms).
144. Id. (statement of Sen. Helms) (accusing LSC of fighting the American people on
welfare reform and working to enshrine a constitutional right to advocacy aimed at
thwarting the will of the people); see also AN UNSOLVED MYSTERY, supra note 124, at 4
(noting Representative Largent's accusation that legal services was to blame for slowing
down the process of welfare reform); Kilwein, supra note 107, at 54 (quoting an LSC
opponent who accused legal services of "creatting] a permanent class of welfare recipients
who drain resources from the rest of society"). Limited government and personal
responsibility were key principles of the "Contract With America" which dominated
congressional activity during this period. See Braucher, supra note 127, at 55.
145. The OCRAA of 1996, by which restrictions to legal services were enacted, was the
same legislative vehicle for the historic reform of welfare programs. OCRAA §§ 501-509.
146. See 141 CONG. REC. 16,994 (1995) (statement of Sen. Helms).
147. 142 CONG. REC. 18,633 (1996) (statement of Rep. Dornan).
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policies down the throats of local governments and citizens."'"
Welfare reform issues, LSC opponents insisted, were political issues
without relevance to the legal rights of the poor.149
LSC just barely survived the call for its total elimination, but
not without suffering a crippling loss of funds."5 Program funding
was reduced by thirty percent and resulted in dramatic reductions
in staff and office closings.15 Aside from the loss of funding, new
restrictions added new burdens on programs. Certain classes of
clients were eliminated from eligibility for legal services, including
prisoners (those already convicted as well as pretrial detainees),
many categories of immigrants, and public housing residents
alleged to have been involved in criminal drug activity.152 Those
who remained eligible were limited in the types of legal issues
which could be addressed on their behalf.15 Congress added to the
list of prohibited substantive legal issues and forbade LSC-funded
attorneys from engaging in any advocacy that challenged the
constitutionality of state or federal welfare statutes or regulations
in any forum.'"
148. 141 CONG. REc. 16,994 (1995) (statement of Sen. Helms). Representative Burton
characterized litigation to challenge a family cap on welfare benefits to mothers who have
additional children as promoting a radical agenda. See Dept of Commerce, Justice, and State,
The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 130 (1996) (statement of Rep. Burton).
149. 141 CONG. REc. 23,988 (1995) (statement of Rep. Kassebaum) (criticizing legal
services for addressing "political causes, such as welfare reform").
150. See OCRAA §§ 501-509.
151. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance, supra note 74, at 378 (stating that funding cuts
resulted in a loss of nearly thirteen percent of the staff and office space). Without adjusting
for inflation, federal funding is currently less than the allocation in 1981; when adjusted for
inflation, it is less than half of the 1981 appropriation. See HMDDENAGENDAS, supra note 137,
at 2.
152. See OCRAA § 504(aX15) (prohibiting representation of incarcerated persons); 45
C.F.R. § 1637 (1997) (same); § 504(aX11) (prohibiting representation of certain noncitizens);
45 C.F.R. § 1626 (1997) (same); § 504(aX17) (prohibiting representation of certain public
housing tenants accused of criminal drug-related activity); 45 C.F.R. § 1633 (same). In 1997,
an amendment to the statute allowed a narrow exception to the prohibition on representation
of undocumented immigrants: non-LSC funds could be used to serve indigent aliens who
were victims of domestic violence matters directly related to the abuse. 45 C.F.R. §
1626.4(a)(1)(2). This was known as the "Kennedy Amendment." d.
153. Seegenerally OCRAA § 501-509;Accountability forLegal Services, WALLST. J., Sept.
13, 1995, at A12 (arguing that legal services should be limited to helping poor people with
"normal legal problems").
154. OCRAA § 504(aXl); 45 C.F.R. § 1632; OCRAA § 504(aX14) (prohibiting abortion-
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Moreover, the legal tools and strategies available to pursue
permissible representation were severely circumscribed. Class
actions, characterized by opponents as "the sexier lawsuits," were
prohibited.'55 Congress prohibited LSC lawyers from representing
anyone who might have been provided with "unsolicited advice" to
protect their rights by obtaining counsel or taking legal action.'56
LSC lawyers were prohibited from lobbying legislative and
administrative rule-making bodies. 15 7 They were also denied the
right to seek state or federal statutorily authorized attorney's fees
from adverse parties. This thwarted the ability of LSC clients to
enforce statutory rights, to deter against repeated wrongdoing, and
deprived LSC programs of the opportunity to obtain additional
revenue for program work.' These restrictions distorted the
traditional attorney-client relationship; they required disclosure of
information related to the identity of legal services clients as well
as the substance of their cases, neither of which is permitted in
private attorney-client relations.'5 9
The restrictions encumbered all nonfederal program funding as
well. 60 In an effort to assure complete control of LSC program
activity, Congress banned the use of all funds, public or private, on
behalf of any activity prohibited from using federal funds. 61
Congress extended its control to non-LSC entities as well, by
related litigation); § 504(a)(16) (prohibiting challenges to welfare reform laws); 45 C.F.R. §
16 (same).
155. 142 CONG. REc. 18,629 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hunter) (stating that legal services
programs are supposed to be doing "ham and eggs work for the poor"); see also 141 CONG.
REC. 23,988 (statement of Rep. Kassebaum) (referring to the need to "protect against the
filing of frivolous class action law suits"); 45 C.F.R. § 1617.
156. OCRAA § 504(aX18); 45 C.F.R. § 1638.
157. OCRAA § 504(aX2)-(6); 45 C.F.R. § 1612; 142 CONG. REC. 15,464 (1995) (statement
of Rep. McCollum) (suggesting that poor people's rights could be sufficiently limited to the
forum of the courts alone).
158. OCRAA § 504(aX13); 45 C.FR. § 1642.
159. Clients must disclose their name, address, and other identifying information about
their case to the national LSC office as well as the general public in order to remain eligible
for services. 45 C.F.R. § 1644.1-44.4 (1998). Clients must also agree to give LSC a signed
written statement of facts to which the attorney-client or attorney work product privilege no
longer applies. 45 C.F.R. § 1636 (1998); see also Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders
and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2187, 2221-31 (1999) (providing an
overview of ethical issues posed by the restrictions).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2996i(c) (2000); see also OCRAA § 504(d)(s)(B); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.
161. OCRAA § 504(d)2)(B); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.
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imposing restrictions that prevented LSC-funded organizations
from transferring non-LSC funds to non-LSC entities as an
alternate means of carrying out prohibited advocacy."6 2
The restrictions imposed by the 104th Congress remain virtually
intact, with the notable exception of the ban on welfare advocacy. 163
This is due in part to new regulations enacted in 1998 that were de-
signed to discourage programs from challenging the restrictions. 16 4
LSC programs have also endured similar ideological attacks at the
state level with federal restrictions being sedimented by"state-level
copy cat restrictions."16 In sum, congressional foes succeeded in
162. OCRAA § 504(dX2XB); 45 C.F.R. § 1610.7. This was eventually challenged and
modified so that LSC programs could allocate non-LSC funds to be used for prohibited
activities but only to an entity that was organizationally separate and independent from the
LSC program. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (1997). For a discussion of the inefficiencies and
additional burdens created by this restriction, see David Udell, The Legal Services
Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York, Virginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 337 (1998).
163. 45 C.F.R. § 1639 (1997); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1626.4(aX1X2) (1997) (noting an
exception for representation of battered immigrants); Velaquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F.
Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (addressing changes to restrictions on transfer of funds). A
lawsuit, Dobbins v. Legal Services Corp., No. 97-00182 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 14, 2001),
challenging LSC restrictions on the use of private funds, is pending. For a discussion of the
challenge to welfare advocacy restrictions, see infra Part IIA.2.
164. See Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance, supra note 74, at 380 n.37 (citing the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-19, § 504(a), 11 Stat. 2440 (1998), which allows LSC to
debar programs from future grants if they substantially violate the restrictions or if they sue
LSC because of the restrictions). The regulations also eliminated the right to a hearing before
an independent hearing officer when LSC sought to terminate or deny refunding. Id. at 380
n.38.
165. Ralph Ranalli, Bar Group Seeks to Boost Legal Services to the Poor; Conservative
Think Tank Files Dissenting View, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 2000, at B1 (noting opposition
to state funding for the Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corp. because of the program's
involvement in rent regulations, parental leave, and work requirements for welfare
recipients); see Silverman, supra note 35, at 978 (noting efforts by New York state and local
government officials to condition the receipt of "homelessness prevention grants" by
restricting the type of suits that could be filed); BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, LSC
RESTRICTION FACT SHEET No. 1: THE RESTRICTION BARRING LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION-
FUNDED LAWYERS FROM BRINGING CLASS ACTIONS, at http:/www.brennancenter.org/
resources/resourcesactclassactfactsheet (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) (noting duplication of
class action restrictions in several states and IOLTA funded programs);. BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE, LSC RESTRICTION FACT SHEET No. 4: THE RESTRICTION BARRING LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION-FUNDED LAWYERS FROM ASSISTING ALIENS, at http://www.
brennancenter.orgresources/resources actalienstfactsheet (last visited Nov. 1, 2002)
(stating that legal services opponents influenced Virginia's decision to ban any state funding
for legal services for representation of migrant workers in employment matters); see also
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reshaping law for the poor to conform to political economic interests
of the day.
2. Challenging the Restrictions
Legal challenges to the 1996 restrictions eventually reached
the Supreme Court in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.66 The
plaintiffs included an LSC program client who lost her public
benefits for allegedly failing to comply with job search require-
ments.167 She challenged the constitutionality of New York State's
welfare reform laws which denied her the opportunity to demon-
strate in a pretermination hearing that her physical impairments
prevented her from work-related activities.'6 The suit was pending
when the LSC restrictions were enacted which barred legal services
attorneys from raising such issues, whereupon Velazquez's attorney
withdrew. 1 9 Efforts to obtain substitute counsel in the case failed
and Velazquez lost her benefits.
70
The suit challenged the scope of the restrictions imposed on both
federal and nonfederal funds. 17' The Court of Appeals for the
Houseman, supra note 159, at 2196-97 (reviewing state restrictions in Texas and
Washington).
166. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). The plaintiffs filed suit against LSC for implementing the 1996
restrictions, and the Government intervened in district court to defend them. Id. at 537. For
an overview of Velazquez authored by lead counsel for plaintiffs, see Burt Neuborne & David
Udell, Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 83 (2001). Prior to
Velazquez, a New York state case held that an LSC lawyer financed by non-LSC funds did
not have to withdraw from representation. Varshavsky v. Geller, No. 40767/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 24,1996), reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Dec. 31, 1996, at 22. A federal district court also issued
an injunction in favor of five LSC-funded programs which challenged the constitutionality
of restrictions related to non-LSC funds. Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961
F. Supp. 1402, 1420-22 (D. Haw. 1997). The same court, however, vacated the ruling after
LSC issued amended regulations. Legal Aid Soc'y ofHaw. v. Legal Servo. Corp., 981 F. Supp.
1288, 1294 (D. Haw. 1997), affd in part and vacated inpart on other grounds, 145 F.3d 1017
(9th Cir. 1998).
167. Neuborne & Udell, supra note 166, at 85-86 n.16. Other plaintiffs included LSC-
funded attorneys, elected officials of the City and State of New York, and a private program
donor. Id.
168. Id. at 86 n. 16.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323,326-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Although
the district court initially questioned the constitutionality of the restrictions on non-LSC
funds, it eventually found the saving regulations issued by LSC adequate, and the remaining
768
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Second Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of the restrictions
attaching to non-LSC funds, but found the prohibition on welfare
reform litigation to be impermissible, viewpoint-based discrim-
ination in violation of the First Amendment; the court enjoined its
enforcement. 172 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the
welfare reform restriction.
173
In a five-to-four decision, the Court affirmed the injunction,
finding that the restriction banning challenges to welfare reform
was an impermissible violation of the First Amendment. 17' The
Court distinguished Velazquez from its previous decisions involving
restrictions on government-funded speech and expressed concern
about the autonomy and integrity of the judicial process. 175 It
identified the traditional flow of advocacy in a courtroom as a
particular "medium of expression" which the LSC regulations
distorted. 176
The Court determined that the obligation of LSC-funded
lawyers is to facilitate the speech of their clients within the venue
of the judicial system.177 The restrictions were found to alter the
traditional role of the attorneys in the courtroom, disturb the
development and maintenance of a well-informed judiciary, and
threatened "severe impairment of the judicial function."178 Such an
effect, the Court determined, was "inconsistent with the accepted
separation-of-powers principles" and implicated First Amendment
interests by insulating welfare laws from constitutional scrutiny,
restrictions valid. Id. at 344.
172. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 765-67 (2d Cir. 1999).
173. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537.
174. Id.
175. Specifically, the Court distinguished Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), which
upheld restrictions on government-funded speech when the government is the speaker or
when it uses private speakers to convey its message, andRosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819
(1995), which struck down speech restrictions that arise in a traditional public forum (the
University of Virginia) designed to facilitate divergent views. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 540-43.
176. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 534.
177. Id. at 542-43.
178. Id. at 544-45 (acknowledging that an informed judiciary presumes an informed,
independent bar which would be impaired if regulations inhibited an attorney from
presenting "all the reasonable and well-grounded arguments necessary for the proper
resolution of the case').
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particularly because there was "no alternative channel for expres-
sion of the advocacy Congress seeks to restrict."79
The Court, however, diminished the significance of the holding
for poor people and their lawyers by clearly pronouncing that legal
services to the poor are a function of government largess without
right of entitlement.'80 Although the Court considered the degree to
which the government could attach conditions to its largess, and
objected to the impact the ban on welfare reform had upon the
integrity of the courts, it accepted without discussion the long-
standing limitations on legal services funds and declined to consider
the constitutionality of the remaining conditions imposed on federal
funding.18
1
Despite an otherwise significant victory for LSC programs and
their clients, a substantive problem remains embedded in the
Court's decision: Legal protection for the poor stands as a
discretionary service that the government may or may not choose
to fund. The Court understood that poor clients lack alterative
resources to obtain legal assistance, but it also held that it was not
the responsibility of the government to subsidize such services or
sanction all cases in federally funded programs.182 Law for the poor
was construed as a privilege. This construction effectively under-
mines the implementation of Locke's social contract through which
the legal system provides the mechanism for the resolution of
179. Id. at 546-47 (noting the unlikely possibility that an indigent client wishing to
challenge the constitutionality of welfare reform laws could find other counsel).
180. Id. at 548 ("Congress was not required to fund an LSC attorney to represent indigent
clients; and when it did so, it was not required to fund the whole range of legal
representations or relationships."). The Court made reference to LSC funding as a
government subsidy program throughout its decision, noting that the suit involved a subsidy.
Id. at 544.
181. Id. at 537-38. Although both sides in Velazquez petitioned for a writ of certiorari, the
Court only granted the defendants' writ. See Neuborne & Udell, supra note 166, at 88. The
Court recognized that the restrictions established two tiers of legal cases and created
"lingeringdoubt" about the efficacyof"truncated representation" provided by LSC attorneys.
Id. at 534. However, it has subsequently refused to consider the remaining limitations on
advocacy or acknowledge that matters worthy of constitutional review had been raised in
Velazquez. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 532 U.S. 903 (2001) (denying certiorari
regarding challenges to remaining issues).
182. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548.
[Vol. 44:737770
LAW AS LARGESS
disputes concerning any matter of right, governed by standing rules
applicable to all parties, both rich and poor.'
B. Challenges to Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA)
Programs4
While the original assault on legal services was maintained
largely by politicians seeking to redefine the role of government to
facilitate a laissez-faire economy, a conservative organization
seeking to affect legal policy in the courts on behalf of principles of
property rights, economic liberty, and free enterprise led the next
challenge to legal services for the poor.8 5 The Washington Legal
Foundation (WLF) initiated several lawsuits around the country to
challenge IOLTA funding for legal services.'"
IOLTA programs, usually located within state bar organiza-
tions, provide significant funding to programs designed to improve
the administration of justice and expand legal services to the
poor. '7 IOLTA accounts were developed as a result of the 1980
changes to federal banking laws. These laws authorized interest-
bearing checking accounts for individuals and charitable organiza-
tions thus allowing lawyers to combine client trust accounts which,
if deposited separately would yield no interest because of their
nominal amount or short-term nature.'88 In combination with other
183. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
184. IOLTA programs also are known as Interest on Lawyers Accounts (IOLA) programs.
See Joseph H. Genova, A Key Victory for IOLTA, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 17, 2000, at 2.
185. See Washington Legal Foundation, at http-J/www.wlf.org/resources/WLFMission
(describing the Washington Legal Foundation, the chieflitigator against IOLTA, as a public
interest law and policy center devoted to promoting individual freedom, limited government,
a free market economy, and a strong national security and defense) (last visited Nov. 1,
2002).
186. For a list of IOLTA legal challenges by WLF and other groups see infra note 191. See
Plaintiffs' Complaint, Phillipsv. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No. 96-1578), 1997
WL 525726, at *5a (filed Feb. 7, 1994) for an additional description ofthe organization; Joint
Appendix at 5, Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No. 96-1578).
187. See Christine A. Klein, Beating a Dead Mouse: Do IOLTA Programs Create an
Unconstitutional Taking of Private Property?, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 1, 5-6. LSC
notes that as a national average, state funding accounts for the second largest funding
stream, followed closely by IOLTA funds. See LEGAL SERVICES CORP., SERVING THE CIVIL
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS, A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (2000).
188. See Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 303, 94
Stat. 132, 146 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000)); see also 12 C.F.R. § 204.130
77120021
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client trust funds, however, these accounts could yield significant
interest.189
IOLTA funds were first distributed to offset the loss of revenue
suffered by LSC programs in the early 1980s, and to provide
support for legal advocacy in cases where access to federal funds
was barred."9 Opponents of legal services objected to the manner
in which the funds were allocated and filed suits in a number of
states. They claimed that IOLTA programs violated their First and
Fifth Amendment rights by coercing financial support for programs
with which they disagreed, and by taking property without just
compensation. 191
The centerpiece of the litigation campaign was Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation,'92 filed in February 1994, which
challenged the Texas IOLTA program. The WLF claimed that
the interest accruing in IOLTA accounts constituted property
belonging to individual client depositors and expressed political and
ideological disagreements with IOLTA recipients which "advocated
various 'liberal' causes, such as the expansion of anti-discrimination
rights" as well as the "expansion of the rights of undocumented
aliens."193 On June 15, 1998, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
(1997) (clarifying which individuals and organizations are eligible for these accounts).
189. See Talbot D'Alemberte, T ibutaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, FLA. B.J.,
Apr. 1999, at 12, 16; Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Making Something Out of Nothing:
The Law of Takings and Phillips v. Wash. Legal Foundation, 7 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 285,286
(1999); Klein, supra note 187, at 2.
190. See Lorenz, supra note 91, at 314.
191. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 795 F. Supp. 50, 56 (D. Mass. 1992)
(granting defendants' motion to dismiss), affd, 93 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993); Cone v. Fla. Bar,
626 F. Supp. 132, 137 (M.D. Fla. 1985), affd, sub nom., Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d
1002 (11th Cir. 1987); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So.2d 389, 395-96 (Fla. 1981); In
re Interest On Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983); In re Minn. State
Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982); In re N.H. Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1260-61
(N.H. 1982); see also Heller & Krier, supra note 189, at 287-88 n.12 (noting that the highest
courts of seven states have determined that IOLTA programs are not a taking and that
thirty-seven state supreme courts adopted IOLTA programs pursuant to rule-making
authority while five states did so through legislation); Plaintiffs' Complaint, Phillips v. Wash.
Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No. 96-1578), 1997 WL 525726, at *15a-16a (filed Feb. 7,
1994); Joint Appendix at 14-15, Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No. 96-
1578).
192. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
193. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No.
96-1578), 1997 WL 525726, at *9a-10a (filed Feb. 7, 1994); Joint Appendix at 9-10, Phillips
v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No. 96-1578).
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Court sided with IOLTA opponents on Fifth Amendment grounds,
finding that the interest generated by IOLTA accounts was the
property of the client depositors."94
In the absence of any economic value which might inure to client
depositors, the Court nonetheless recognized the depositors'
"valuable rights" in IOLTA accounts.' 95 Because these "valuable
rights" do not have positive existence and are not available to the
depositors except as the power to deprive IOLTA programs of their
use, the Court had to shift its focus from what the owner had lost
to what IOLTA had gained in order to reach its conclusion. The
Court derived property interests from the right of depositors to
exclude others from that which they themselves could never obtain;
property interests which could not exist but for the very program
the WLF was challenging.
The Court's method, which conceptually and contextually
severed the question of property from the issues of taking and just
compensation, allowed IOLTA's social purpose and the values of
equal justice otherwise relevant to the remaining Fifth Amendment
concerns to remain unexplored.' In its effort to define and protect
194. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 160. The Fifth Circuit had previously ruled only that the interest
constituted property and did not address the question of whether IOLTA programs
constituted a taking. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d
996, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996).
195. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 169-170. The Court noted that the "interest income at issue here
may have no economically realizable value to its owner." Id. at 170.
196. See Heller & Krier, supra note 189, at 291-93 (coining the phrase "contextual
severance" "in order to echo the familiar problem of'conceptual severance' in takings law");
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,1172 (1967) (discussing the social purpose
component of takings law). The constitutionality of IOLTA programs is uncertain, as it
continues to be litigated in a piecemeal fashion. In October 2001, the Phillips case returned
to the Fifth Circuit on appeal. The circuit court ruled that the IOLTA program amounted to
a per se taking ofclient property. Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found.,
270 F.3d 180, 188 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'g en ban denied, 293 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 2002), petition
for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3092 (2002) (No. 02-1). Without IOLTA, however, there was no
interest to allocate to depositors as just compensation, so the appellate court determined that
the only remedy was injunctive relief and remanded the case. Id. at 194-95. WLF also filed
suit challenging IOLTA as it applied to licensed professional officers authorized to conduct
real estate transactions. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 841
(9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2355 (2002). The Ninth Circuit upheld IOLTA on
Fifth Amendment grounds but remanded it for consideration on First Amendment grounds.
Id. at 861-64. A Boston nonprofit law firm filed suit against the Massachusetts program in
January of 2002. Citizens for the Preservation of Constitutional Rights, Inc., Justices of the
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property rights, the Court avoided weighing the social gain derived
from IOLTA against the loss of the power to exclude, now conceived
as a property right. It ignored issues of fairness that required
balancing government interests against private losses inherent in
Fifth Amendment concerns. 97
In addition to the ideological interests advanced by WLF, the
statements of interest of amici in the Phillips case revealed the
tension between the principles of equal justice and the interests of
the free market economy with which the Court sided. For example,
the Mountain States Legal Foundation, organized for the "defense
and preservation of individual liberty, the right to own and use
property, limited government, and the free enterprise system," filed
an amicus brief arguing in support of the "constitutional vitality of
private property rights" at stake. 198
Similarly, the Pacific Legal Foundation, which advocates for
"less government and the preservation of free enterprise, private
property rights and individual liberties,"' 99 entered as amicus in
furtherance of its goals. The National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation,2" an organization opposed to "compulsory unionism"
in the name of "individual freedom," urged the Court to consider the
Fifth Amendment property rights of those opposed to funding legal
services organizations. The Phillips decision can be viewed as a
demonstration of the supremacy of property and free market
interests over social programs that fund access to the law for the
poor.
Supreme Judicial Court Sued for Violating Federal and State Constitutions, at
http:/Avww.julyfourth.net/pressrelease-ioltaO2Ol23.pdf (Jan. 23, 2002). For a copy of the
complaint in the case, see Citizens for the Preservation of Constitutional Rights v. Marshall,
available at http://wwwjulyfourth.net/ ioltaO20123Complaint.pdf(last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
197. Michelman, supra note 196, at 1193, 1218-19 (discussing Fifth Amendment
requirements that necessitates balancing social needs against private losses and concerns
of compensation and fairness).
198. BriefofAmicus Curiae Mountain States Legal Found., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.
524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No. 96-1578), 1997 WL 634323, at *1-2.
199. See http://www.pacificlegal.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2002); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Pacific Legal Found., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found. 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No. 96-1578), 1997
WL 631770, at *2-3.
200. See http://www.nrtw.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2002); Brief of Amicus Curiae National
Right to Work Legal Defense Found, Inc. at *34, Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S.
156 (1998) (No. 96-1578), 1997 WL 626850.
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IOLTA opponents have not only sought to eliminate funding
streams for legal services through litigation, but they have also
lobbied state bar organizations responsible for funding priorities to
restrict and curtail the use of these funds.2 ' As a result of these
tactics, combined with IOLTA's uncertain legal status, it is likely
that previous innovative proposals to expand IOLTA funding will
be abandoned." 2 Program regulations may be introduced to require
attorneys to obtain consent from clients before their deposits may
be aggregated into IOLTA accounts, which will result in a reduction
of funds.03 IOLTA requirements may include "opt out" provisions,
which will lead to the same effect.2 4 Recently, IOLTA programs
have imposed additional restrictions on their funding by mirroring
federal LSC restrictions and diverting funds previously used to
support representation of persons off-limits to LSC programs to
advocacy deemed to be less controversial.0 5
201. HIDDEN AGENDAS, supra note 137, at 10 (noting that the Farm Bureau, a long-
standing opponent of legal services, targeted IOLTA funding for legal services programs).
Brief of Amicus Curiae National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Phillips v.
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (No. 96-1578), at 1997 WL 626850, at * 3-4.
202. See Meeker & Dombrink, supra note 36, at 2228 (proposing to expand IOLTA to real
estate escrow accounts): Another likely effect may be attorney reluctance to continue to
deposit client funds in IOLTA accounts. See Deborah Goldberg, Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts: Private Interest in the Public Interest, N.Y. L.J., July 15, 1998, at 2 (reporting that
"lawyers are wondering whether they should continue to place client money in pooled
interest-bearing IOLTA accounts"); George M. Kraw,A Matter ofPrinciple: IOLTA Programs
are Wrong Unless They are Voluntary, RECORDER (San Francisco), Jan. 25, 2001, at 5,
(arguing that Mandatory IOLTA programs are illegal and that "individual legal consumers"
should not be required to contribute to them), available at http'//www.law.comjsp/
printerfriendly.j sp?c=LawArticle&t= PrinterFriendlyArticle&cid=1015973978656 (last visited
Nov. 1, 2002).
203. Lorenz, supra note 91, at 315-16.
204. Heller & Krier, supra note 189, at 301.
205. See Houseman, supra note 159, at 2196-97 (noting new IOLTA restrictions in Texas
and Washington). In New York, four law school clinics funded with IOLTA money to initiate
class actions and to represent immigrants and prisoners no longer eligible for legal services
recently lost IOLTA funding despite having received favorable evaluations. See Randal C.
Archibold, Funds Stopped for Legal Problems Helping Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 2001, at B6; see also Victoria Rivkin, IOLA Funding Changes Prompt Attacks, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 20, 2000, at I (noting a substantive shift in philosophy in the grants and a significant
reduction in funding for class actions against the government); Victoria Rivkin, IOLA Gives
$11 Million to 76 Nonprofits, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 2000, at 2 (describing various IOLA-funded
programs).
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C. Constraining Law School Clinics
Powerful forces have also targeted law school clinical programs
that are perceived to be at odds with business and political
interests.206 The most notable attack on law clinic advocacy involved
Tulane Law School's Environmental Law Clinic (TELC), in which
amendments to the Louisiana state student practice rule limited
the clients law school clinical programs could serve.2 "7 Opposition
to the clinic was motivated by Tulane law students' representation
of a low-income, predominantly African-American community
organization which sought to halt the proliferation of hazardous
environmental wastes, by preventing the local construction of
another chemical plant.2 "8 Using established regulatory procedures
under the Environmental Protection Act (EPA), law students
attended administrative hearings and successfully raised issues of
environmental discrimination to challenge the improper issuance
of state pollution permits.2"
Adverse reaction to TELC's representation followed imme-
diately. Business interests seeking to locate the new plant in the
state joined with the Governor, who had acted on their behest
by offering large tax incentives, and exhorted the president of
Tulane University to prevent TELC from engaging in any further
environmental justice advocacy. 210 The Governor pressured univer-
sity donors to suspend contributions as a means of influencing the
206. See Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: DenyingAccess
to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235, 269 (1999) (noting that law clinic involvement in
desegregation, prison conditions, death penalty, civil rights, suits against governmental
bodies, and environmental advocacy have precipitated efforts to terminate faculty members,
eliminate law school-legal services partnerships, and narrow the types of cases law clinics
can accept).
207. Id. (providing a comprehensive overview of the legal challenges involving the attack
on the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic).
208. See SCLC v. Supreme Court of La., 252 F.3d 781,784 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 464 (2001); 252 F.3d at 784; see also Joy, supra note 206, at 243. Members of the
community group were residents of St. James Parish, known as "Cancer Alley" because of
the elevated cancer rates in the area attributed to the chemical and industrial plants. See
Joy, supra note 206, at 243.
209. SCLC, 252 F.3d at 784; Joy, supra note 206, at 243. As noted by the district court, the
clinic received only private funds. See S. Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) v. Superior
Court of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 511 (E.D. La. 1999).
210. See Joy, supra note 206, at 243-44.
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work of the clinic.21' Business organizations called upon the
Louisiana State Supreme Court to investigate the clinic, charging
that the clinic's use of the EPA regulatory process was tantamount
to the imposition of "social views of the faculty and students in the
courts of the State of Louisiana as well as before Administrative
Bureaus ... in direct conflict with business positions."212 Business
organizations and politicians urged the court to amend the student
practice rule authorizing law students to provide legal assistance.213
Clinic students and faculty who used established EPA complaint
procedures on behalf of their clients were referred to as "modern
day vigilantes" and "storm troopers."21'
The campaign had the desired effect. The state supreme court
amended the student practice rules by restricting the class of
eligible clients and limiting group representation.215 The new rules
prohibited law students from representing any individuals or
groups with whom the clinic had initiated contact in order to advise
them of their legal rights.216 The new rules also required disclosure
of individual group members' income, thereby exposing membership
rosters to privacy violations while creating practical difficulties in
accumulating such information.2 7
In response to the amended rules, in Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) v. Supreme Court of Louisiana, a
coalition of plaintiffs filed a civil rights suit against the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in federal court seeking relief on First
and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.218 The suit charged that
business and political forces seeking to protect their economic in-
terests influenced the state supreme court through extrajudicial
211. Id. at 244.
212. Id. at 246.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 243.
215. See LA. SUP. CT. R. 20, §§ 4-5 (as amended Mar. 22, 1999). These rules have been
described elsewhere as the most restrictive rules limiting clinic representation in the
country. See Joy, supra note 206, at 238.
216. LA. Sup. CT. R. 20, § 10.
217. See id. § 5.
218. SCLC, 252 F.3d at 783. Plaintiffs included four classes of affected persons and
entities identified as community organization clients, student organizations, law faculty, and
law students. Id. at 783 n.1.
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machinations.2 1 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court allegedly responded
to external pressure by reducing the capacity of law clinics to serve
as legal advocates for the poor.2
°
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims first by
confirming the lack of a constitutional right to legal representation
in a civil case.22' Having anchored the plaintiffs' claims with the
weight of that reaffirmation, the court then characterized clinic
representation as a government benefit made possible through
state-sponsored student practice rules.22 2 It noted that courts have
routinely upheld conditions imposed on government benefits;
therefore the plaintiffs could not sustain their complaint against
stricter indigency standards. 22' The plaintiffs' charges that undue
political pressure and business influence were used to obtain the
state supreme court amendments were deemed insufficient to raise
a justiciable controversy.224
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and held that the
student practice rules amendments did not constitute constitutional
violations, although it did acknowledge that "the motivation of a
state actor can transform an otherwise permissible action into a
violation of the First Amendment."2" The court noted that the
plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to support their claim that the
state supreme court "reacted to pressure from the Governor and
business interests who bore the TELC significant animus," and
found viable allegations of extrajudicial interference with the
court's rule-making processes."' But it distinguished the act of
219. Id. at 784.
220. Id. at 785.
221. SCLC v. Superior Court of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506 (E.D. La. 1999).
222. Id. at 506, 511 (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that no government funds were at
issue and noting that without the student practice rules enacted by the state supreme court,
clinic students could not serve as student attorneys; thus the rules themselves were held to
constitute some sort of government benefit).
223. Id. at 511.
224. Id. at 513.
225. SCLC, 252 F.3d at 792 (relying on Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), which
struck down a state statute requiring equal time for "creation-science" because of the
improper motivation of the state legislature and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972),
which upheld the constitutional claims of a professor whose contract with a state university
had not been renewed in retaliation for the professor's public criticism of the Board of
Regents).
226. Id. at 794 (noting that the plaintiffs had alleged that the Governor and business
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influence-peddling from those of consequence, thereby absolving the
Louisiana Supreme Court for responding to business interests and
their political backers. 27
Perhaps the pivotal issue in the TELC controversy was revealed
in the reply of the Governor of Louisiana when he was asked
whether low-income residents seeking enforcement of the
environmental laws had a right to counsel: "Let them use their
own money, not Tulane's."m The SCLC decision replicated the
Governor's objections to poor citizens' use of the law to challenge
business interests when the legal representation was provided free
of charge and outside the realm of the market. By accepting the
underlying claim that clinical legal services to the poor are a benefit
subject to the mediation of the state supreme court, the appellate
court effectively reduced indigent citizens' access to the law to that
of a gratuity.229 Furthermore, SCLC made it manifestly clear that
the limits of gratuity are constrained when the poor seek to
challenge established economic and political interests.
The consequences of the TELC controversy were both immediate
and persistent. Tighter indigency standards, enacted without
regard to an accurate measure of poverty, reduced the number of
clients eligible for TELC services. 23° Stringent eligibility require-
ments for community organizations curtailed legal assistance for
groups who are unlikely to obtain a substitute source of legal
counsel. As a result of the constraints on group representation, it is
likely that the nature of advocacy provided by TELC will shift.
Community groups often raise broad social and political issues that
groups bore animus toward the clinic but did not allege that the Louisiana Supreme Court
held such views).
227. See id. at 794-95.
228. Joy, supra note 206, at 244 (quoting Murphy J. Foster, Governor of Louisiana).
229. See SCLC, 252 F.3d at 791-92. The appellate court also acknowledged that the
Supreme Court's holding in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), limited
the government's power to place conditions on legal services-related government benefits.
Id. at 791. However, the appellate court ruled that the state supreme court had not abused
its power and claimed that none of the special considerations present in Velazquez applied
in SCLC. Id. at 792.
230. See Louis Uchitelle, How to Define Poverty? Let Us Count the Ways, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2001, at B7 (noting that the determination of the poverty level to which federal aid
programs are indexed is out of touch with reality and commenting that even the Census
Bureau, which produces the data, does not believe its own numbers).
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require complex legal responses and result in substantive reforms
by means of litigation."' The Louisiana student practice rule
amendments are likely to inhibit law reform litigation for the poor,
which is precisely the outcome sought by TELC's opponents.
The TELC case may also portend more things to come. A new
environmental law clinic at the University of Pittsburgh lost all
state funding, and was threatened with having all its ties to the
university severed." 2 Nationally, law school clinics have been
assailed by the Washington Legal Foundation. The WLF launched
an offensive campaign through paid advertisements, warning that
"olur next generation of lawyers and judges are being inundated
with a heavy dose of ideological activism as they are encouraged to
join the radical causes of the day."28 Four law school clinic
programs providing services that are banned from LSC funded
programs, including services to poor, undocumented immigrants,
prisoners, and class action suits, recently lost funding under
circumstances suggesting political interference." 4 Efforts to curtail
law clinic advocacy seem to replicate other events which have
resulted in diminished legal resources for the poor.
231. KESSLER, supra note 30, at 76-77 (noting that legal services programs that work with
community groups often engage in law reform activity and address problems "endemic to a
poverty class").
232. See Don Hopey, Law Clinic at Pitt Feeling Pressure: Controversy Swirls Over
Environmental Clients, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Oct. 17,2001, at B1 (reporting that the
elected officials were acting on behalf of business interests who were outraged that the clinic
had represented groups opposed to the development of a new expressway and logging efforts);
see also Terry Carter, Law Clinics Face Critics, ABA JOURNAL, July 2002, at 24 (noting 'the
prevalence of attacks by business interest on law school environmental clinics across the
country"); Don Hopey, Law Clinic Reaction Unusual, Others Say Pitt Response to Issue
Unlike Other Schools', PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 2, 2001, at B1 (noting that Pitt's
administration responded equivocally in defense of its environmental law clinic).
233. Advertisement, InAll Fairness: A One-Sided Paper Chase, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,2000,
at A19. The advertisement argued that students "should have the opportunity also to work
in clinical programs that defend property rights and limited government," and promoted the
group's own Economic Freedom Clinic at the George Mason University Law School. Id.
234. The clinics were defunded despite favorable evaluations about their work and the
decision to defund was made along party lines: "All five who voted against the programs were
Republicans and the four supporters were Democrats." Archibold, supra note 205.
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D. Reducing Opportunities for the Award of Legal Fees:
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources
Buckhannon Board and Care Home,- Inc. v. West Virginia
Department offHealth and Human Resources2s5 is yet another recent
case that is likely to limit the opportunities for poor people to
protect their rights. In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court considered
the circumstances in which a plaintiff could recover attorney's fees
when litigating important civil and constitutional rights claims.
Plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Housing Amendments Act
(FHAA) and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), both of
which provide for attorney's fees for the prevailing party." e They
alleged that state requirements that led to the closing of assisted
living residences were in violation of both the ADA and the FHAA
and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 7 The state legislature
responded to the suit by enacting corrective legislation, whereupon
the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case
as moot.2"8 Plaintiffs then moved for attorney's fees, claiming status
as the prevailing party pursuant to both the FHAA and the ADA
under the "catalyst theory" which grants fees for a lawsuit that
achieves the desired result even if the defendant remedies the
violation without court order.23 9
In a five-to-four decision affirming the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' request for
attorney's fees and held that a party could not be considered to have
prevailed "except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable
judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the legal
relief sought.' ° The Court repudiated the holdings of all other
circuit courts that had considered the issue and discarded previous
statutory interpretations that had recognized the "catalyst theory"
235. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
236. Id. at 601 (citing Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(cX2) (1988) and
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1990)).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 602 (quoting S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.
1994) (en banc)).
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as consistent with legislative meaning and purpose.241 The majority
delineated the conditions by which a party might be considered to
have prevailed in a lawsuit in order to be eligible for fees.242 It ruled
that obtaining the desired outcome as a result of filing suit was not
sufficient, but rather that a "judicially sanctioned change in the
legal relationship of the parties" was the determining factor for
awarding fees.
2 41
The legislative history concerning fee-shifting awards is at odds
with Buckhannon: Both House and Senate Reports explicitly state
that the phrase "prevailing party" does not require the conclusion
of a lawsuit with formal judicial endorsement. 24" Nor do the
statutory provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964245 or the Civil
Rights Act in 1976, which includes the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Award Act,2 6 include language that would require a court
resolution. The purpose of attorney's fees pursuant to fee-shifting
statutes was not to privilege judicial determinations. On the
contrary, the "catalyst rule" is fully consistent with the con-
gressionally recognized need to encourage and empower citizens to
vindicate important civil rights and constitutional violations. 247
241. Id. at 601. The Court noted that nine circuit courts followed the "catalyst theory." Id.
at 602 n.3.
242. Id. at 603 (obtaining guidance on the definition of"prevailing party" from Black's Law
Dictionary); see Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a
Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 51 (2001) (critiquing the Court's reliance on the
dictionary in resolving constitutional claims).
243. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
244. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976) ("The phrase 'prevailing party' is not intended
to be limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the
merits."); S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976) ("[Plarties may be considered to have prevailed
when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining
relef.').
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (2000). "In any action commenced pursuant to this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable
for costs the same as a private person." Id. § 2000a-3(b).
246. Id. § 1988.
247. See id. § 2000a-3(b) (providing attorney's fees for violations in public
accommodations); id. § 2000e-5(k) (providing attorney's fees for violations in employment);
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("IT]he judicial decree is not the end
but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation
of action) by the defendant ....") (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)).
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Buckhannon also reaffirms free enterprise interests which
discourage intervention on behalf of the poor except through market
corrections by reinvigorating the "American" rule that each party
bear its own litigation expenses.'" It reflects an endorsement of the
Rule of Law as a private matter, "giv[ing] precedence to the
autonomy of individual parties and idealiz[ing] free exchange" and
freedom of contract.249 Support for this view has reemerged in the
last ten years: in 1991, the President's Council on Competitiveness
urged a moratorium on fee-shifting statutes operating in favor
of successful plaintiffs.' This idea has garnered support from
the conservative organizations who filed as amicus briefs in
Buckhannon, expressing concern for the preservation of free
enterprise, minimal government interference, and a commitment
to the unfettered ability of businesses to make decisions in the
marketplace.2
1
Buckhannon reflects a deepening hostility toward poor people
who rely on fee-shifting statutes and the lawyers who represent
them; Buckhannon may be seen as part of the larger trend to
eliminate these practices. 52 The Buckhannon decision will make it
248. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602, 607; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
249. Joshua P. Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement: Allocating
Attorney's Fees by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,48 ALA. L. REV. 65,91 (1996)
(describing the libertarian view of the legal resolution of disputes as a private affair); see also
John M. Blumers, Note, A Practice in Search ofa Policy: Considerations ofRelative Financial
Standing in Cost Awards Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), 75 B.U. L. REV.
1541, 1563 (1995) (suggesting that the "American" rule may derive from resistance to fee
regulation in favor of freedom of contract by which clients might be charged "whatever the
market would bear").
250. Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2039-40
(1993).
251. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the Pac. Legal Found., Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (No. 99-1848), 2000 WL
1873812, at *1 (speaking to "support[] the concept of limited government"); Brief Amicus
Curiae for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc., Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (No. 99-1848), 2000 WL
1868106, at *5 (seeking "to preserve their freedom to make decisions regarding the safety
and satisfaction of their customers"). Twenty-seven states also filed as amici, concerned
about state coffers and state responsibility for fees in civil rights matters. See Brief of the
States ... as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home Inc.
v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (No. 99-1848), 2000 WL
1868103, at *1.
252. In 1995, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L.
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more difficult for the poor to litigate in behalf of their constitutional
and civil rights, with far-reaching consequences. Those without
resources to litigate privately formerly turned to public interest law
firms that collected attorney's fee awards to advance their clients'
agenda of achieving social reform.2 53 But as a provider of collective
goods, public interest law firms rarely generate sufficient resources
from private interests and therefore frequently encounter difficulty
in sustaining adequate funding.25" Most depend on grants,
donations, and court-ordered fees for much of their income and
revenue.255 Without attorney's fees, public interest law firms may
be unable to provide legal counsel for poor people, thereby further
reducing the poor's access to the judicial process.
Buckhannon is likely to affect public interest law firms in
other ways as well. Public interest law firms engage in more than
litigation.25 They also provide research and educational materials,
assist with grass roots organizing, legislative lobbying, and
administrative agency advocacy; these are all activities likely to be
No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626
(2000), 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2000)), which
limited fees for attorneys undertaking prisoners' civil rights lawsuits. For an overview of the
Act's limitations on attorney's fees and its impact on civil rights enforcement for prisoners,
see David C. Leven, Justice for the Forgotten and Despised, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1999). The
PRLA fee reduction provision was not designed to discourage frivolous law suits as fees are
paid only if the suit is successful. Id. at 16. Congress' intent, rather, appears as an effort to
discourage prisoner litigation altogether. Id. at 16-17. See generally Karen M. Klotz,
Comment, The Price of Civil Rights: The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Attorney's Fee-Cap
Provision as a Violation of Equal Protection of the Laws, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 759 (2000).
253. See Martha F. Davis, Our Better Half A Public Interest Lawyer Reflects on Pro Bono
Lawyering and Social Change Litigation, 9 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. POLLY & L. 119, 119-20
(2001) (describing legal organizations which assist the poor such as NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund and NAACP Legal Defense Fund which generally do not receive federal
funds and litigate a coordinated agenda on behalf of interest groups); see also Earl Johnson,
supra note 107, at 39 (noting the significance of court-awarded fees for private lawyers in
filling gaps created by LSC restrictions). 1
254. See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 5 (1977) (noting the
difficulty of public interest law firms in obtaining revenue from the private market because
of the collective goods they provide and the attendant free-rider problems); Mureiko, supra
note 53, at 440 (arguing that civil rights fee-shifting statutes function to provide public
goods).
255. WEISBROD, supra note 254, at 5-6 (discussing how public interest law firms are highly
dependent on nonmarket sources of funds, including grants, contributions, and court-ordered
fees).
256. See BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 22 (1978).
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adversely affected by loss of fees. 7 Buckhannon not only reduces
the opportunities for reform and rights enforcement in the courts,
but it may actually contribute to the demise of an institutional
forum that serves the interest of the poor in a variety of settings.
These events serve to expel poor citizens from the process of
enforcing laws and eliminate a class of people from the social
discourse that informs the litigation process.2" They also demon-
strate that former suggestions that public interest law firms could
minimize the impact of the LSC restrictions on law reform activity
may need to be reconsidered in light of Buckhannon.2 9 In the end,
legal rights may have "no greater reality than an aspiration for
those without the financial resources to exercise [them]."2 Such a
system which "guarantees to the poor that their basic human needs
will be met but which provides individuals no realistic means with
which to enforce that right" has been described as "grotesque."261
III. LAW AS LARGESS: PUBLIC WELFARE AND PRIVATE CHARITY
The tension between the principles of the Rule of Law as
understood in the national narrative and the values of the
marketplace that reject government interference in favor of free
enterprise exchanges is made evident through a consideration of
the provision of legal services to the poor. The weakening of legal
257. See id. at 554-55.
258. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLuM. L. REV. 1384 (2000) (describing the
benefits of including private citizens in the process of reforming unconstitutional practices);
Kilwein, supra note 107, at 52 (noting many of the public interest law firms likely to be
affected by the Buckhannon decision frequently co-counseled significant litigation with legal
services programs).
259. See Lorenz, supra note 91, at 318 (suggesting legal services programs should resolve
to leave the impact work to the non-LSC funded public interest law firms); Rhudy, supra note
81, at 230-31 (discussing an increase in public interest advocacy organizations and the
proliferation of single issue nonprofit organizations which can retain counsel to continue law
reform efforts on behalf of the poor).
260. Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 75 CowNELL L. Rzv. 1185, 1254 (1990) (describing constitutional rights as
wealth-dependent and noting that the Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), came close to acknowledging that enforcement ofconstitutional rights, specifically the
abortion right, may be dependent on financial means).
261. See Marrero, supra note 69, at 775.
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institutions that assist the poor demonstrates the ascendancy of the
values of the market which subsume concerns for equal justice. As
standards ofjustice yield to the normatively derived ideology of self-
sufficiency, the Rule of Law is fashioned as a privilege. It is
transferred from the context of rights with presumptive canons to
the setting of largess, with a discretionary ethos.
To understand this transformation, it is necessary to consider
the recent challenges to legal services for the poor in the larger
context of structural inequities and the political biases by which
goods and services are delivered to the needy through public
welfare programs and private philanthropy. The theories and
practices of these mechanisms are derived from historical traditions
that bear on cultural conventions, religious beliefs, philosophical
perspectives, and economic policies.262 An examination of largess in
both the public realm and private spheres demonstrates that they
share common programmatic and conceptual norms and are
validated by similar discursive motifs.2"3 Although government
relief and voluntary giving typically involves the delivery of food,
shelter, medical care, and subsistence cash allowances, 264 the
shared principles and norms by which basic goods and services are
distributed are embedded in subsidizing legal services or "donating"
access to the law. This Part provides an overview of the salient
concerns relative to public welfare and private charity for the
purposes of examining their relevance to legal services for the poor
and the deficiencies that result from either method of largess. It
reveals the transformation of law for the poor from rights to
privilege and the resulting loss of the benefits of the social contract
underlying the Rule of Law.
262. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA 1-12 (6th ed. 1999) (tracing religious, philosophical, and historical
political institutional roots of welfare and charity); DAVID WAGNER, WHAT'S LOVE GOT TO Do
WITH IT? A CRmTIcAL LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARITY 75-88 (2000) (same).
263. WAGNER, supra note 262, at 8.
264. GOODIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 29-30 (noting consensus about the need to distribute
food, housing, and health care regardless of wealth); WAGNER, supra note 262, at 9 (citing
social security pensions, health care, and other income supports as examples of public
programs).
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A. Public Welfare in the Liberal Political and Economic State
1. Political and Economic Theory
The proposition of public responsibility for the general welfare
of citizens is deeply rooted in the narrative of national well-being.
The discourse incorporates philosophical and moral precepts
examining the very underpinnings of a just society.26 5 But despite
the long-standing significance of social arrangements for the well-
being of the poor shaping the characteristics of civil society, welfare
systems remain consigned to a wary and unsettled place.
A number of dominant themes can be distilled from the political
and economic debates by which the liberal welfare state validates
the welfare system. The liberal political theory that emerged with
the rise of the capitalist state has been premised on the proposition
of liberty, which is generally conceived as freedom and autonomy.266
As a concomitant of liberal political theory, liberal economic theory
has extolled relations of free exchange of mutual benefit from which
assumptions about poverty and notions of a just society are
derived. 2 7 Although it has been argued that liberal political theory
is a contextual concept linked to historical conditions, beliefs about
liberty and individuality have been frozen as "immutable and
absolute truths" firmly established as the bedrock of laissez-faire
economy and have "transformed liberalism into a conservative
ideology."26
8
265. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 473-74 (suggesting adherence to morality principles is
motivated by the desire to create just institutions to benefit others); TRATrNER, supra note
262, at 1-12 (tracing the customs and background of social welfare programs to philosophical
and religious foundations).
266. See generally GOODIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 40 (noting that although the
formulations of liberalism's values vary, they may be best expressed as a concern for liberty
as John Stuart Mill expressed: freedom and autonomy); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859) (constructing a theory of liberty based on freedom and
autonomy).
267. See GOODINETAL., supra note 6, at 41 (describing liberalism as "endorsing'capitalist
acts between consenting adults'" and "relations of free exchange" (citing Nozick)); Amy L.
Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL Y & L., 477, 479 (2001) (describing
John Rawls' and David Gauthier's contractarian approaches to justice as requiring people
to make positive contributions to society in order to receive corresponding support from
others).
268. ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMEPicAN DEMOCRACY 432 (1991).
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Liberal welfare states, like their social democratic and
corporatist counterparts, seek to reduce poverty and to promote
economic efficiency, social equality, and autonomy.269 Different
systems may share similar goals, but the difference in emphasis
sets the contrasts in normative hierarchies in sharp relief, and
inevitably results in dramatic programmatic shifts and variances
in outcomes. The liberal welfare system stresses economic
efficiency.2 7 1 The model relies primarily on economic and market
factors and secondarily on kinship systems, community ties, and
private charities.272 The market is prized as the optimal regulatory
mechanism for the distribution of goods and services and its
superiority is said to foreclose the need for safety-net programs
except through a residualist welfare system.273
2. Characterizing the Poor in a Liberal Welfare State
Liberal economic theory constructs a parallel principle that
those who require assistance do not offer contributions that are
valued by society and hence forfeit the possibility of economic
exchanges. 27 ' The failure to contribute or otherwise derive benefit
from economic participation is perceived as a default of an over-
riding social contract. 275 The theories contained in free market
269. GOODIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22. The authors note that the liberal welfare state
remains the dominant model in the United States. Id. at 40.
270. See generally id. at 260-84 (examining a number of different systems). Social
democratic regimes emphasize social equality and the elimination of poverty. The regimes
also rely primarily on economic factors, but are predisposed to manipulating key features of
the market economy and market distribution to assist the poor. Id. at 267. The corporatist
welfare model relies on social integration into the paid workforce to achieve its main purpose.
Id. at 273.
271. GOODINETAL., supra note 6, at 88.
272. Feminist theorists argue that the system is premised upon kinship systems involving
unpaid work in the family. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 123
(1989).
273. See Anthony Giddens and WillHutton in Conversation, in GLOBALCAPITALISM, supra
note 13, at 44 (noting that markets are considered superior in all regards compared to
government and that markets foreclose the need for social justice programs).
274. GOODIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 42 ("Ifthe market fails to reward certain people very
much, ... those people do not make very much of a contribution that other people value very
much. They do not have anything that very many other people want very badly.").
275. See Wax, supra note 267, at 478-80.
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economies thus presume a pathology of poverty, whereby persons
unable to subsist without intervention are judged as defective.276
Poverty serves as an ongoing issue in the national debate
centered on public obligations versus private responsibility. Efforts
are made to determine if poverty is a product of subjective
conditions such as personal character flaws or circumstances of
objective factors such as compelling adversity.2" Is poverty due to
an unwillingness to work or an inability to work? Is one lazy or is
one ill? The poor frequently are classified in such familiar formulaic
terms as "deserving" or "undeserving."27 ' At the core of this
formulation, set in bold relief in the form of a moral distinction, is
whether one can work or whether one is otherwise excused from
such an obligation. 9
The condition of those unable to maintain themselves through
productive economic relations is explained as a function of their
individual or idiosyncratic deficiencies. Those deemed as the able-
bodied poor who do not work have historically been stigmatized as
deviants and criminals, living on the margins of society, and a
potential threat to social order.' Joblessness and idleness are
coterminous, and about idleness the culture is clear: it is the devil's
workshop. Poverty thus assumes an ominous form as the specter of
a threat, requiring surveillance and control of all who descend into
this netherworld. More recently, suspicion of the poor has focused
on recipients of welfare. Recipients are depicted as deviant families,
276. JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORmING THE POOR 5 (1972). A "deviant" strand of liberalism
exists that considers poverty to be a function of market failures, but is not the dominant
trend. See GOODIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 44-45.
277. See HANDLER, supra note 276, at 6 (noting that the traditional basis for
distinguishing among the poor is fault).
278. Joel F. Handler, The 'Third Way" or the Old Way?, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 765,787 (2000)
(summarizing welfare history as separating the "deserving poor" from the "undeserving
poor").
279. See Handler, supra note 68, at 906 ("Those who are excused are the'deserving poor;'"
those who must work are the 'undeserving.'); Wax, supra note 267, at 481-82 (noting
assumptions that everyone should work for a living unless they are exempted because of a
dependency not of their own making). It is interesting to note that the affluent with
independent incomes derived from sources other than their labor and who do not work are
not stigmatized, and are often praised for their independent means. See Samuel Brittan, In
Praise of Free Lunches, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Aug. 24, 2001, at 9.
280. Handler, supra note 278, at 778; see also Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare As We Know
It, 49 STAN. L. REV. 471, 492 (1997).
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sexually promiscuous and immoral single women, drug addicts and
derelict mothers, unworthy of assistance, and the source of myriad
contemporary social problems.28' The vilification of the poor even
has entered the legal text of constitutional claims related to welfare
benefits; including insinuations that the poor are unwilling to work,
commit fraud, child abuse, and otherwise behave in ways that
breach legal and moral norms. 2 On the other hand, those
perceived to be incapable of self-support due to age or disability are
viewed more sympathetically and considered generally to be worthy
of relief."8
The representation of the able-bodied idle as morally deficient
is driven by a desire to discourage dependency on public assistance
and a belief that goods and services are best allocated through free
commerce and market exchanges.2"4 In these formulations, the
government is portrayed as performing a disservice to the very
people it seeks to aid.' Public assistance, the argument claims,
acts to undermine the work ethic and contributes to generational
cycles of welfare dependency and a culture of poverty.
Myths and misconceptions loom large in the debates.2 86 Despite
claims of generational dependency, the research suggests that the
period of dependency is often relatively brief.2"7 Accusations of
281. Handler, supra note 278, at 793 (suggesting that welfare has become a code word for
inner-city substance abusing women who are breeding a criminal class).
282. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79
GEO. L.J, 1499,1522-25 (1991) (suggesting that in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), the
Court attempted to redefine a challenge to the constitutionality of home visits, required as
a condition of receipt of AFDC, into a challenge concerned with the propensity of poor
mothers on AFDC to abuse their children, despite the fact that the state had not claimed
abuse as a basis for requiring the home visits). Ross further suggests that in Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987), the Court conveyed the immorality of the poor by depicting
them as undeserving beggars without a basis to complain about welfare benefits. Ross, supra,
at 1530-31.
283. See Handler, supra note 68, at 928 (noting that if the inability to work is clear, a
recipient is spared the stigma of being scorned as "undeserving").
284. See GOODIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 45 (describing the fear that the poor will rely on
public handouts as a first line of support rather than a last recourse); Law, supra note 280,
at 477 (describing historic principles of welfare programs which granted the poor aid but left
them miserable enough that they would choose work over aid).
285. See Law, supra note 280, at 492 (observing that "[plolitical leaders ... can at once
define welfare as society's central problem and 'solve' it by ending it").
286. For a general discussion of welfare myths, see id. at 474-83.
287. Half of AFDC recipients rely on aid for less than a year and three-fourths leave
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excessive welfare spending on the unworthy poor as the source of
government debt and a burden improperly borne by the hard-
working taxpayer overshadow the truth of the matter. These sums
amount to less than expenditures on non-means tested programs
and are comparatively less than what is spent in most European
countries.288 Perhaps the most persistent myth is that the poor need
only to work in order to avoid dependency. In addition to the lack
of sufficient work to meet the demand for full employment, large
numbers of working people live in conditions of indigence due to low
wages. 289 Thus, the very dichotomy between the deserving and the
undeserving poor is suspect.
A corollary assumption about the dispensation of public
subsidies as a function of social relationships is the expectation that
recipients be grateful for the aid they receive. In another context,
historian Louis A. Prez, Jr. describes gratitude as a means to
achieve social control and domination.' Prez reviews the
literature of philosophy and social science in describing gratitude
as a "moral duty" which imposes an indebtedness on the recipient
of a benefit and ingratitude as "the essence of vileness and wick-
edness."291 For the poor who depend on government assistance to
survive, the reciprocities implicit in "aid" ratify hierarchies of
domination and subordination. Public assistance is contingent on
uncritical acceptance, a transaction that serves to deny agency to
within two years. Id. Other studies demonstrate that economic class and education, not
welfare receipt, are the valid predictors of generational welfare and poverty. Id. at 476-77;
see also E. J. Dionne, Muddying the Water with Facts, WASH. POST, May 28, 1996, at All
(debunking myths 'spread by politicians who exaggerate the time and amounts spent on
welfare, and other untruths about the numbers of children of welfare recipients).
288. Law, supra note 280, at 474-75 (refuting assumptions about the costs of welfare and
noting the comparatively low amounts that the United States provides for poor children); see
also GOODIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 11 ("Over four-fifths of the money the U.S. government
spends on social protection goes not on means-tested benefits of the sort most strongly
associated with the liberal welfare regime but rather on social insurance schemes of a more
corporatist sort ....").
289. Stephen Wizner, Rationing Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1019, 1024 (noting
studies that demonstrate a significant number of working people live in poverty).
290. Louis A. Prez, Jr., Incurring a Debt of Gratitude: 1898 and the Moral Sources of
United States Hegemony in Cuba, 104 AM. HIST. REV. 356, 359 (1999).
291. Id. at 360 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE 123, 128 (Mary J.
Gregor trans., 1964)).
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poor people, and specifically undermines the moral basis to
challenge conditions of public welfare.
3. Resulting Welfare Policies and Programs
Welfare policies constructed around the dominant liberal
economic and political ideologies have produced minimalist benefits
that are targeted to the fewest eligible recipients. 2  Cycles of
greater generosity that provide increased aid or a moderated
rhetoric about the character of the poor are often designed to
regulate the labor supply, maintain social control, and quiet civil
unrest, as much as they are to relieve the misery of the poor.293
Increases in government support for the poor also occur as domestic
extensions of foreign policy initiatives."' Welfare programs are
tightly controlled through elaborate screening processes designed
to exclude as many people as possible and suggest a lack of trust in
the poor. 5 Those who are deemed eligible for aid are further
subjected to conditions of other types. Mandatory work require-
ments and compulsory participation in programs designed to
"improve" the poor have been a historic feature of public aid.298
Payments may be conditioned on additional prerequisites to locate
absent fathers, obtain child support payments from unwilling
292. GOODINETAL., supra note 6, at 45, 240-41. Transfer payments have been so low that
the "undeserving" poor located at the lower tier receive amounts considered punitive. See id.
at 44-45.
293. See TRATrNER, supra note 262, at 280 (noting an increase in public welfare during
the Great Depression to prevent disorder and talk of revolution); Handler, supra note 65, at
926 (explaining that welfare policy focuses on the need to maintain social control and the
ability to maintain economic production and quell disorder).
294. TRAWrNER, supra note 262, at 313 (noting that the Soviet Union's embarrassing
exploitation of the United States' domestic poverty influenced welfare policy during the Cold
War).
295. See GOODIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 51 (describing elaborate mechanisms to prevent
ineligible individuals from seeking benefits). A recent lawsuit challenged welfare practices
in two counties in California requiring home searches as a condition of receiving welfare
benefits. See Welfare Home-Search Case is Widened to a Class Action, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 2002, at B5. Recipients are scrutinized periodically to corroborate extreme
levels of impoverishment and satisfaction of eligibility conditions. See HANDLER, supra note
276, at 2.
296. See HANDLER, supra note 276, at 3 (noting mandatory participation in programs to
"improve family and personal functions"); Handler, supra note 278, at 784-85 (explaining that
mandatory work programs have been historic features of welfare programs).
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parents, or endure home searches.2 7 Current policies contain work
and counseling requirements, time restraints, benefit amounts
conditioned on family composition, and restrictions on family
allowances when teens leave school." These policies have neither
alleviated suffering nor affected rates of dependency; instead they
have resulted in increasing levels of inequality.2"
B. Law for the Poor as Public Largess
Law for the poor's station within the realm of the liberal welfare
state is two-fold. First, it is provided principally through federal
subsidy in the form of legal services programs which, as the
Supreme Court noted in Velazquez, are an entitlement that the
government may chose to fund or not."ec Second, much of legal
services' instrumental purpose relates to securing government
benefits and employing state redistributive mechanisms. This Part
examines the principles of the liberal welfare state as applied to law
for the poor and considers the treatment of legal services as a
welfare benefit and as an entity whose identity is often conflated
with the impoverished constituency it serves.
1. Law for the Poor Shaped by Political and Economic Theory
The prevailing liberal welfare state theories that view market
relationships as the preferred mechanism for the distribution of
goods and services make no exception in the realm of law.301 The
297. HANDLER, supra note 276, at 2. The ACLU reports that about 9000 people annually
are subjected to home searches as a condition of welfare benefits. Welfare Home-Search Case
is Widened to a Class Action, supra note 295.
298. See 42 U.S.C. § 608 (2000).
299. See GOODIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 241-42 (noting that liberal welfare policies that
emphasize economic growth and efficiency over government transfer payments as the
primary means for alleviating poverty do not achieve their goals, and when compared with
more generous social democratic or corporatist welfare regimes, these policies rank the
lowest in stimulating income growth and are the least effective in reducing poverty rate);
Faux & Mishel, supra note 13, at 99, 102 (claiming that in the United States, the tax and
transfer system increases levels of inequality and that per capita income growth in the
United States is below that of other advanced countries).
300. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
301. See Jon Johnsen, Legal Needs Studied in Market Contexts, in THE TRANSFORMATION
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legislative debates about legal services are instructive here:
federally subsidized legal services programs are said to interfere
with marketplace solutions." 2 Congressional opponents proposed
private attorneys as the preferred method of providing law for the
poor and denounced free legal services as an impediment to the
markets' ability to supply such services."0 ' Other detractors of
federally-funded free legal services have advocated for the
deregulation of the legal profession in order to create a second-tier
of lawyers limited to the "simpler cases ... most often handled for
the poor."0 4 Adversaries have employed classic liberal market
rhetoric to criticize the program as a manifestation of a federal
government that has expanded beyond its proper size; a big
government out of control.0 5 Those Republicans who supported
legal services have been attacked by more conservative colleagues
for abandoning a "supply-side, limited government agenda."30 6
OF LEGAL AID, supra note 107, at 219 (noting that in liberal welfare states, the market is the
main mechanism for distributing legal services); Johnson, supra note 253, at 34-35
(reviewing proposals such as diminished contingent fee arrangements and fee-shifting
measures requiring "losers" to pay fees and costs as a means to lower the legal cost of certain
institutional interests). The trends of mandatory private arbitration and alternative dispute
resolutions further limit remedies and serve to remove the state as an intervening force. See
id.
302. See infra notes 303-06 and accompanying text; Kilwein, aupra note 107, at 60.
303. See 142 CONG. REC. 18,627 (1996) (statement of Rep. Ballenger); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT BUDGET REPORT 14-15 (June 4, 1981) (on file at National Equal Justice
Archives, Inc. (NELJ), papers of Burton Fritz) (noting that so long as free legal services are
available, the private bar's ability to supply low cost representation will not be explored).
304. W. Clark Durrant II, Access to Justice: A Challenge to the Legal Profession, Address
to the American Bar Association Board of Governors in New Orleans, Louisiana (Feb. 12,
1987) (on file at NELJ archives, Box #1). Durrant, then Chairman of the LSC under
President Reagan, who sought to terminate the legal services program, proposed that a type
of law school be established which would train "lawyers ... in significantly less time and at
less cost ... to provide basic services. Competent practitioners who are not looking for Wall
Street but simply wish to handle the simpler, less costly cases, cases most often handled for
the poor." Id.
305. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
306. See Robert Schlesinger, New Group Supports "Reaganites' but Breaks 11th
Commandment, HILL, Dec. 1, 1999, at 13 (noting that the conservative political group "Club
for Growth" criticized some Republican members of Congress for supporting legal services
as not sufficiently dedicated to "a supply-side, limited-government agenda").
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2. Law for the Poor as Welfare: Characterizing Poor Clients
and Their Lawyers
Liberal welfare policies that stigmatize the poor have particular
application to the poor with legal problems. From the early periods
of legal aid, legal difficulties among the poor were viewed as a
result of "personal pathology rather than structural injustice."30 7
Representation was offered selectively to carefully screened clients
deemed deserving; undeserving clients were denied assistance.308
Federal regulations institutionalized these distinctions by creating
categories of ineligible clients and limitations on the types of cases
that could be handled." 9
In recent years, the classification of clients into "deserving" and
"undeserving" has dominated federal funding decisions for LSC and
has resulted in harsh program eligibility criteria. Congressional
critics have characterized a large segment of legal services clients
as cheats, criminals, and deviants whose poverty and dependency
are both avoidable and a function of individual fault."0 Community
groups seeking free legal assistance are viewed suspiciously as
deviating from the profile of the deserving poor. Programs feel
pressure from critics to create a litmus test by which to judge client
morality rather than the legal merit of the claim. 1' Moral judg-
ments about legal services clients are not limited to federal funding
controversies and have appeared in the debates about state funding
307. KATZ, supra note 74, at 39.
308. Houseman, Political Lessons, supra note 74, at 1671 (noting that early legal aid
programs excluded the "undeserving" and were prohibited from offering assistance in many
types of cases, including divorces, which were considered luxuries); see also KATZ, supra note
74, at 44 (describing limitations on legal aid cases considered necessary as a result of
personal pathology).
309. Russell G. Pearce et al., Ethical Issues Panel, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357,360 (1998)
(reporting the panel discussion comments of Helaine Barnett).
310. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
311. U.S. Letter: McFarland, NEW YORKER, Nov. 4, 1967, at 173-74 (quoting an LSC
program attorney that opponents to the program's litigation agenda "really want us to be
judges rather than lawyers. They want us to make certain that the client's case is worthy-
and that the client is worthy."); see also HIDDEN AGENDAS, supra note 137, 12-13 (suggesting
that the National Legal and Policy Center, a legal services foe, would prefer legal services
to only represent those clients which they consider morally worthy); Wizner, supra note at
289, 1020 (rejecting an alternative to an equal justice model of legal services requiring
programs to screen applicants and accept only the "worthy" cases of the "deserving" poor).
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as well. 12 Program supporters are compelled to rely on the same
dichotomized framework by defending the program as one that
helps the blameless victim, the elderly, and children. 1 '
The stereotypes of poor clients as culpable for their dependence
on legal services are employed to justify the limitations and
conditions of the services. Such fallacies, however, fare no better
under close scrutiny than the typecasting of the poor who rely on
government benefits generally. Many legal services clients are
employed; many have suffered involuntary unemployment because
of market failures through no fault of their own. 14 They may be
more accurately described as the working poor, veterans, family
farmers, people with disabilities, and victims of natural disasters. 15
In addition to clients, legal services as an institution has been
cast in terms of the "unworthy" and condemned in antiwelfare
discourse as fraudulent and wasteful.316 The motives and means
used by legal services lawyers have been impugned, by which they
are also stigmatized. Congressional opponents describe legal
services attorneys as ideologically-driven radicals, neo-Marxists,
and socialists dedicated to "promoting divorce and homosexuality,
312. For the past three years, the Governor of New York has proposed a budget seeking
the elimination of funding for prisoners' legal services. This funding was established in 1971
in the aftermath of the 1971 Attica Riots in order to assist inmates with their legitimate legal
grievances. See Matthew Cox, The State Budget: Pataki Seeks a Hike, NEWSDAY, Jan. 12,
2000, at AS.
313. 142 CONG. REc. 18,634 (1996) (statement of Rep. Baldacci) (highlighting legal
services' advocacy for battered women and their children); id. at 18,636 (statements of Reps.
Collins and Pelosi) (emphasizing legal services' representation of battered women); id. at
18,636-37 (statement of Rep. Costello) (discussing legal services and domestic violence
victims); id. at 18,553 (statement of Rep. Loewy) (emphasizing legal services' assistance of
battered women); id. at 18,630 (statement of Rep. Schiff) (typecasting a 65-year-old
grandmother as the worthy client often assisted by legal services); id. at 19,425 (statement
of Rep. Cummings) (focusing on legal services and domestic violence victims).
314. See BRENNAN CENTERFORJUSTICE, MAKINGTHE CASE: LEGAL SERVICES FORTHE POOR
17-18 (1999) (noting that in most programs, at least one-third to one-half of clients work, and
many clients were once comfortably middle class, but lost theirjobs as companies downsized).
Those that reentered the workforce often were paid less with fewer benefits, but were
carrying the debt burdens incurred earlier. Id.
315. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, SERVING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS, A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 13 (2000), available at http://www.lsc.gov/
pressr/exsum.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
316. See supra notes 135-36, 5-36 and accompanying text.
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helping drug dealers, and putting farmers out of business."317 They
are portrayed as "a gaggle of political activists run amok" 8 and are
accused of "social engineering, social campaigning, and rabble-
rousing"'19 and are denounced for representing clients against
market interests. 2
However, accusations about program fraud and waste have
proven to be misleading. 2' Contrary to charges that legal services
has become an expensive bureaucracy, the LSC budget, both in
terms of overall budget expenditures and the total justice system
budget, is an insignificant figure that has continually been reduced
since 1980."2 Typecasting legal services attorneys similarly fails.
While most legal services attorneys wish to help the poor, more
specific motivations vary; however, there is no demonstrated
correlation between law reform efforts and lawyers' political
motivations. 3  In fact, the majority of cases handled by legal
services lawyers are individual cases considered nonthreatening to
the status quo. 24
As a final comparison to the general workings of the welfare
state, the corollary expectation of gratitude and the ensuing state
of dependency of the poor has inserted itself firmly into the
discourse and practice of law for the poor, affecting both clients and
their lawyers. Dependency discourages poor people from exercising
317. HIDDEN AGENDAS, supra note 137, at 2.
318. KESSLER, supra note 30, at 1 (quoting Sen. Jesse Helms).
319. Id. at 54 (quoting various judges).
320. Statement of Samual T. Currin, Legal Assistant to Senator Helms (Sept. 25, 1980)
(on file with NELJ archives, papers of Burton Fritz).
321. LSC had been accused of spending public funds on luxurious board meetings and
tropical getaways when in fact, the accusations stemmed from a letter written by a longtime
critic of the legal services program produced as an April Fool's joke, but bearing the
unauthentic signature ofJohn Mckay, then.LSC president. The "April Fool's" letter described
first-class flights and extravagant vacations paid at government expense, when in fact, at
least eighty percent of LSC board meetings are held in or near Washington, D.C. and ninety-
seven cents of every federal dollar for LSC goes to local programs that provide direct client
services. ABA STANDING COMMrIrEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENSE REPORT (on file
with NELJ archives, Ross Box #1).
322. Johnson, supra note 253, at 31-32.
323. See KESSLER, supra note 30, at 87-88. Lawyer characteristics are not shown to affect
program activities and whatever values they do share have no discernable impact on
litigation strategies. See id. at 103-04.
324. Kilwein, supra note 107, at 52-53.
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their rights, particularly when their action is contingent on
discretionary government benefits. Clients are expected to be
uncritically grateful for the assistance they receive without regard
to issues of quality of representation. 325 Legal services programs
indebted to government funders have often adopted case priorities
and fashioned case strategies designed to avoid giving offense.
326
Indeed, the power of gratitude as a means of control may have
constrained some lawyers from contesting the constitutionality of
the congressional restrictions despite widespread opinion that they
are illegal and unfair.
327
3. Legal Services Restrictions in the Service of the Liberal
Welfare State
Policies shaped by the ideological concerns of the welfare state
and distorted by stigmatization of clients have produced a legal
services system with features typical of welfare programs. First,
federal regulations severely limit those who are entitled to legal
services benefits. Resources are so limited that the needs of no
more than twenty percent of eligible clients can be met.32 The
restrictions on class actions and outreach to those whose rights are
325. Paterson & Sherr, Quality Legal Services: The Dog That Did Not Bark, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID, supra note 107, at 255.
326. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1796 (2001); see
also KESSLER, supra note 30, at 61 (explaining that funding issues heavily influence the
character of legal services and program staff are wary of filing suits against the institutions
that fund them or that may be perceived as controversial); Johnson, supra note 253, at 18
(describing programs as "captive[s] of its principal financial supporters" that forgo some law
suits because of pressure from their financial supporters) (quoting J. HOWARD CARLIN & S.
MESSINGER, CIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR 50 (1966)).
327. Neuborne & Udell, supra note 166, at 84 (noting that members of the civil justice
community registered concern about challenging the restrictions for fear of expressing
opposition to federal funders); see also Jennifer L. Jung, Federal Legislative and State
Judicial Restrictions on Representation of Indigent Communities in Public Interest and Law
School Clinic Practice in Louisiana, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 873, 885 (2000) (describing programs
as fearful, thus refraining from opposing restrictions that impair the programs and their
clients' well-being).
328. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION: STATE PLANNING & RECONFIGURATION 3 (2001) (on
file with author). One jurist noted "the judiciary's greatest dilemma is 'an avalanche of
unrepresented people'" resulting from federal cuts. Editorial, Lawyer-Funded Fellowship
Meets Growing Legal Need, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 24, 1999, at 8A (quoting Chief
Justice Daniel Wathen of the Supreme Court of Maine).
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violated also deny benefits to broader categories of the poor,
assuring that services are tightly targeted and that no benefits
inure to any unqualified individuals.
Next, the restrictions justify the free-market ideology that posits
that the poor are not entitled to the same level of representation as
clients who pay for their lawyers. Opponents have argued that
government funds are limited to a narrow range of services and
limited forums. 29 These restrictions deny the right to seek
assistance in reform-related matters such as redistricting issues,
abortion-related cases, school desegregation concerns, workplace
organizing problems, or seeking attorney's fees as legal protection
and enforcement of rights; all of these rights are considered far too
substantial to be offered gratis.
Opponents have criticized legal services lawyers for providing
too much of a benefit and complained when attorneys for the poor
litigate cases too vigorously. It's as if they think the poor are getting
too much for nothing.3 0 Such arguments fashion a consensus that
deems some legal challenges appropriate only if made by private
lawyers for paying clients.331 This proposition has been stated
bluntly by one legal services foe who said: "Let them do it on their
own nickel."3
32
In keeping with typical welfare programs, the restrictions also
impose difficult conditions on legal services clients in exchange for
services. Regulations undermining client confidentiality and
requiring certain claims and remedies to be abandoned exact a
forfeiture designed to dissuade reliance on legal services
programs.3 3 The restrictions also levy a cost on the programs that
lose revenue in the form of fees, and must endure inefficient
329. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text; OCRAA § 504(aX2)-(6) (prohibiting
representation in the political and administrative law-making processes while acting in the
capacity of an LSC representative); 45 C.F.R. § 1612 (1997) (same).
330. Michelle S. Jacobs, Pro Bono Work and Access to Justice for the Poor: Real Change
or Imagined Change?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 509, 517 (1996) (noting that although private lawyers
often express support for legal services for the poor, their support turns to disapproval if they
perceive their paying clients incurring greater litigation expenses).
331. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After Legal Aid is Abolished, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS
375, 381 (1999).
332. Accountability for Legal Services, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at 12.
333. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
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program configurations in order to comply with program integrity
rules, using nonfederal funding to fill the gaps created by the
restrictions.8"' Audits, routine waste, and fraud investigations are
more punitive than regulatory and distract the attorneys from legal
work and representational activity.
3 3 5
Legal services programs benefit from increased funding when it
meets the needs of government and business interests. Cycles of
government support for legal services have corresponded to the
treatment of welfare programs broadly defined. Subsidies for legal
services increased at a time when welfare benefits expanded.3 3 6 At
the height of its popularity during the "War on Poverty" days,
support for legal services was based in part on the fear of impatient
poor communities and a desire to channel their growing organi-
zational capacities into the legal system as a means of orderly
change.'"7 The importance of legal services was emphasized during
the urban riots of the 1960s when summaries were compiled of all
activities of legal services programs located in the cities where the
disturbances took place.' 33 Communities praised programs offering
to ease tension through legal counsel and advice in almost all
cases. 39 During this period the government was exhorted to expand
legal services to combat "poverty's warping of mind and spirit that
leads many to strike out blindly against their fellow man and
against society."4 ° Conversely, when funding for welfare programs
334. David S. Udell, The Legal Services Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York,
Virginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 YALE L. & POLY REV. 337, 351-53 (1998)
(describing duplicative efforts and inefficiencies as legal services programs spin off separate
entities).
335. See Forger, supra note 138, at 336-37 (describing contact with the Office of the
Inspector General: It's like having the Secret Service living in your organization").
336. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes From a Law School
Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 173-74 (2001) (noting the relation between the liberalization
of the welfare system and an increase in support for institutional legal services in the 1960s);
see Handler, supra note 68, at 899. For a review of the relationship between welfare and legal
services, see DAVIS, supra note 74.
337. Bamberger Papers Box #1 (on file with NELJ archives).
338. Id.
339. Id. The communities notably did not praise and support legal services related to
program efforts soliciting information regarding improper police conduct. Id.
340. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Land and Poverty, Address at the National Conference on Law
and Poverty, Washington D.C. (June 25, 1965) (on file with NELJ archives).
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suffered, so too did legal services. 41 During the 1980s, foes of
welfare programs also attacked legal services, a pattern repeated
in the 1990S.342
The treatment of legal services as a welfare program is also
based on its instrumental purposes that historically have included
enlarging welfare entitlements and promoting redistributive
strategies benefitting the poor. During the OEO period, legal
services lawyers won historic victories related to welfare rights and
entitlements. 43 Attorneys have viewed legal services' court victories
as capable of achieving reforms that expand the welfare state
contrary to free-market exchanges.'" The belief that legal services
attorneys "creat[e] a permanent class of welfare recipients who
drain resources from the rest of society" is a significant factor in the
efforts to weaken legal services during times of austerity as the
government seeks to curtail welfare programs.345 As a program that
invites heightened government intervention and seeks increased
forms of social income, legal services is an entity operating contrary
to an economic regime that favors the very opposite." Legal
services may function as a vehicle to implement the Rule of Law,
however, in these times, this function does not provide it with
sufficient support to prevail against the current political and
economic agenda.
341. See Erhard Blankenburg, The Lawyer's Lobby and the Welfare State: The Political
Economy of Legal Aid, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID, supra note 107, at 118-19
(noting a direct correlation between the status of welfare programs in general and the well-
being of legal services).
342. See id.
343. Kilwein, supra note 107, at 48-49 (describing how court decisions reshaped the
welfare system and established constitutional doctrines supporting such entitlements).
344. Johnsen, 8upra note 301, at 205-06 (noting that legal services is perceived as a
"political tool" that could "trigger reforms" in housing and consumer relations, and could
affect the manner in which the welfare state operates).
345. Kilwein, supra note 107, at 54 (noting the arguments of LSC opponent Howard
Phillips); see also Blankenburg, supra note 341, at 129-30 (observing legal services' forced
retreat when government called for austerity). During the 1995 congressional debates, the
government demonstrated this view by linking legal services to the protection of welfare
benefits the government sought to eliminate. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
346. See Kuttner, supra note 109, at 150-51 (describing the role of government under
global capitalism as assisting with a laissez-faire agenda and providing reduced forms of
welfare).
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C. The Culture of Philanthropy347
1. Principles of Philanthropy
The tradition of voluntary giving as a means to care for the poor
has produced a culture and rhetoric that is similar to, but can also
be differentiated from, welfare theories. Charity has historic,
religious, and symbolic importance, and is perceived as an
expression of virtue and good will.348 Charity mediates at the
intersection of the public institutions and the private market.
Society considers charity a response to distress and need, and a
mechanism for defining, categorizing, and prioritizing social
problems to determine their resolution. 49 As a method of private
intervention, charity is often presumed more creative and efficient
than government programs. 350 Historically, charity sans legal
entitlements and claims of right, has been considered less likely
than government programs to create work disincentives.3 5'
Charity is a complex issue and has been characterized by a
contentious and contrasting discourse. Charity involves social
interactions between rich and poor designed to relieve suffering of
the have-nots. Society has also considered charity a means by which
the wealthy donor assumes the role of creditor in the transaction of
347. The term "philanthropy" here is used interchangeably with charity and refers to "the
process of using money to create change, whether for the betterment of humanity or not,
depending on the project in question." MARK DOWIE, AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS, at xvi (2001).
Charity is sometimes distinguished from philanthropy by scale and focus. See, e.g., Penina
Kessler Lieber, An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 731, 734 (2001).
348. For a review of religions and charity, see TRATTNER, supra note 262, at 1-11;
WAGNER, supra note 262, at 75-88; Maurice G. Gurin & Jon Van Til, Philanthropy in its
Historical Context, in CRITICAL IssuEs IN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 4-5 (John Van Til et al.
eds., 1990).
349. ALTHEA K. NAGAI ETAL., THE CULTURE OF PHILANTmoPY: FOUNDATIONS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 5 (William T. Poole ed., 1991).
350. See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV.
433, 436 (1996) (noting a prevalent view that the government taxes and wastes too much).
351. Id. at 442 (describing early debates advocating charity, "which did not carry the
stamp of right as an improvement over poor laws) (quoting from Elizabeth Wisner, The
Puritan Background of the New England Poor Laws, 19 SOC. SERV. REV. 381 (1945)). The
issue of diminished work incentives, however, still looms large in charity policies. See infra
notes 392-96 and accompanying text.
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giving and receiving.352 Acts of charity are conceived as positive
contributions to the common good that transcend the particular
gift and serve as a manifestation of virtue and benevolence.353
Alternatively, critics have characterized philanthropy as a means
of protecting and enhancing the interests of the wealthy who wish
to maintain their control and influence, and to preserve their
fortunes.3 5 The ambiguous status of charity is further complicated
by differences between proponents of charity, some of whom fund
conservative interests, while others support more substantial
material aid and advocacy for the poor.
The discourse reveals principal attributes about charity not
in dispute: Philanthropic entities possess wealth and the ability
to shape social policy and influence social institutions. s355
Philanthropies engage in the social issues of their choosing, without
accountability to political processes, yet often perform government
functions and influence state power. 5' A sociologist described
philanthropies as "brokers of ideas and ... cultural transmission
belts."357 The power to allocate funds has enormous repercussions
on the lives of the poor and the organizations that serve them.
Philanthropies have engendered a sense of mistrust because of
their concentration of power and wealth, added to their ability to
352. WAGNER, supra note 262, at 82 (noting that in religious tradition, charity was an
exchange: "The almsgiver could now become God's creditor") (quoting R. CARTER, THE
GENTLE LEGIONS 29-30 (1961)).
353. See Leon R. Kass, Am I My Foolish Brother's Keeper? Justice, Compassion, and the
Mission of Philanthropy, in THE ETHICS OF GIVING AND RECEIVING: AM I MY FOOLISH
BROTHER'S KEEPER? 10 (William F. May & A. Lewis Soens, Jr. eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE
ETHICS] (suggesting that acts of charity exceed the particular benefit bestowed upon the poor
and contribute to society by the benevolence the acts manifest); Robin W. Lovin, Compassion
and the Norms of Philanthropy, in THE ETHICS, supra at 27 (noting that acts of charity are
deeds which connote unselfish care for others).
354. See TRATTNER, supra note 262, at 72-73 (describing charity as a means for the
wealthy to control the poor); Mark Dowie, Editorial, Grant Makers: Choose Democracy over
Elitism, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 3, 2001, at 55, 56 (arguing that philanthropies fund
causes which will create influence and greater wealth for them in the future).
355. Dowie, supra note 354, at 56 (observing that philanthropic foundations possess
wealth and influence the nature and quality of American life).
356. Lieber, supra note 347, at 736-37; see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided:
A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 305 (2002).
357. NAGAI ET AL., supra note 349, at 1 (quoting LEWIS A. COSER, MEN OF IDEAS: A
SOCIOLOGIST'S VIEW 337 (1970)).
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control valuable assets that might otherwise go to public coffers.358
Public investigations have criticized philanthropy as a means of
preserving established economic relations, giving credence to ac-
cusations that they are "organizational extensions of the ruling
power of the American economic elite."359 Philanthropy's occasional
purpose as a means to blunt the protests of the poor and to deter
efforts to seek redistribution of wealth and power has been
chronicled by both scholars and ethicists.36 0
The influence of philanthropic entities has grown exponentially
as a result of favorable tax treatment and the increased
privatization of government. Charities are positioned to make
important decisions on matters of social urgency and, in effect,
provide cover for the government's retreat from such responsibility.
But charity may function more as a symbolic concern or "false
generosity" 6' 1 than a force capable of providing sufficient material
aid to the poor. 62 Even as charitable entities have increased their
358. See Lieber, supra note 347, at 736 (noting that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was a
response to concerns about philanthropy's "unbridled power and the potential for abuse").
359. See NAGAI ET AL., supra note 349, at 1; Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and
the Democratization of Dynasty, 39ARIZ. L. REV. 873,923-24 (1997) (describing congressional
investigations regarding whether philanthropies preserve large sums of wealth in order to
wield influence).
360. See WAGNER, supra note 262, at 52 (observing that charity was deemed essential to
control the poor who inspired fear and dread amongst religious and political leaders). Wagner
notes that philanthropic trends often correspond with times of social unrest and the
mobilization of grassroots movements. Id. at 104 (noting the influence of protest movements
in the 1960s and 1970s on corporate donations); see also DOWIE, supra note 347, at xxxiv
(describing charities as "cooling out agencies"); NAGAI ET AL., supra note 349, at 3 (noting
that critics accuse charities of dampening efforts towards significant structural reform);
David H. Smith, Help or Respect: Priorities for Nonprofit Boards, in THE ETHICS, supra note
353, at 58 (disagreeing with the argument, but noting the purpose of giving to the poor is
to "keep them from becoming so envious and angry"); Libby S. Adler, The Meaning of
Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 1, 13-14 (2001) (noting that a fear of social upheaval spurred funding of charitable
organizations such as orphanages); Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and
Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential ofMiddle-and Low-Income Generosity,6 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POLY 325, 343 (1997) (describing philanthropic giving as a means to perpetuate the
interests and concerns of the wealthy). But see NAGAI ET AL., supra note 347, at 3-5
(identifying contrasting views of charity as a manifestation of diverse values providing
necessary resources to the poor).
361. Bullock, supra note 360, at 348 (borrowing the phrase from Paul Friere to describe
the tax policy favoring charitable contributions of the wealthy but paid for by the
disempowered).
362. WAGNER, supra note 262, at 11-12 (describing the discourse of caring and
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assets, levels of wealth inequalities have increased."3 Private
philanthropy is a poor alternative to progressive taxation schemes
and redistributive transfer payments.'" Philanthropy celebrates
the virtues of private giving as altruistic and patriotic, even as it
acts to foreclose taxation and the development of adequate public
policies which would establish humanitarian relief based on a firm
set of institutional principles.
2. Operative Principles
As charity moved from philosophical and religious moorings, its
development reflected assumptions similar to those relied upon by
the state in fashioning welfare policies.365 Charities characterized
impoverished classes as dangerous and depraved. They viewed
assistance as an opportunity to wield moral and religious authority
and used it to reform the character of the poor.16 Although in the
late 1880s, the project of charity relied on theories of poverty that
underscored environmental causes, by the early 1920s its concerns
were refocused largely on individual traits and psychological
impediments as the basis for poverty. 67 The current discourse has
volunteerism as symbolism with little or no material or economic benefit to the poor); Rob
Atkinson,Altruism inNonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501,635(1990) (quotingPAUL
FRIERE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 25-51 (1993)); Brody, supra note 359, at 876 (noting
that philanthropies often care more about saving foundation assets than spending them);
Bullock, supra note 360, at 346 (noting that charities give meager amounts to the poor
compared to contributions to the arts, education, etc.).
363. DOWIE, supra note 347, at x.
364. Atkinson, supra note 362, at 635; see DOWDIE, supra note 347, at x ("Foundation
giving is minuscule compared to the income adjustment that would be required to bring the
United States up to the income and wealth-distribution levels of Europe."); see also WAGNER,
supra note 262, at 11 (describing the discourse of caring as a symbolism that does not
necessarily serve the best interests of the poor in practice).
365. See Gurin & Van Til, supra note 348, at 5 (describing the development of charitable
institutions in a climate of suspicion and distrust of the poor).
366. TRATrNER, supra note 262, at 69-70 (describing the concerns of the New York
Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor (AICP) in the mid-nineteenth century
that the poor, like thieves and beggars, would overrun the city). Trattner further notes that
the AICP blamed poverty on behaviors including crime, sexual promiscuity, and
drunkenness. Id.; see also WAGNER, supra note 262, at 51, 65.
367. TRATrNER, supra note 262, at 101. Trattner describes several movements, including
the "Settlement House Movement," that sought to improve conditions in cities and factories
as a preventive approach to poverty. Id. at 163-87. Changes in social work that saw poverty
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continued this approach, identifying such terms as "dysfunctional,"
"anti-social," and "dependent personality disorder" as new pathol-
ogies to implicate the poor in deviant behavior. 68
The culture of philanthropy has incorporated the notion of
poverty as personal pathology and favors aid for limited individual
relief over structural reform. 69 In recent years, the increasing
influence of free market interests has created pressure on charities
to avoid large-scale funding initiatives and to remain focused on
limited giving to individuals.70 Moreover, conservatives have
challenged the practice of institutional giving altogether and
have urged individual volunteerism typified by the first Bush
Administration's 1988 "Points of Light" initiative as the proper
centerpiece of charitable activity. 71 Philanthropic entities that
target structural reforms have come under increasing attack by
conservatives who insist that charity should be guided by earlier
principles, typified by religious groups providing for only minimal
short-term needs. 72 Any other agenda, it is argued, promotes a
as a personal problem called for moralistic approaches focusing on individual traits. Id. at
254.
368. WAGNER, supra note 262, at 65 (noting that in today's parlance, charities are more
likely to use terms such as "dysfunctional" or "anti-social" to impugn the morality of the
poor); Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, "Dependency" Demystified: Inscriptions of Power in a
Keyword of the Welfare State, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 624-26 (Robert E.
Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1997) (describing psychological discourses used to associate the
dependency of the poor with pathology).
369. Handler, supra note 278, at 779 (noting that historically charities were not concerned
with structural reform); see also ELEANOR L. BRILLIANT, PRIVATE CHARITY AND PUBLIC
INQUIRY: AHISTORYOFTHE FILERAND PETERSON COMMISSIONS 156 (2000) (noting criticisms
of philanthropies for failing to fund social change groups); Charles E. Curran, The Nature of
Philanthropy, in THE ETHIcs, supra note 353, at 36-38 (criticizing charity that focuses on
individual behavior and ignores needs arising from structural problems); GORN, supra note
1, at 62 (noting that in the depression of 1893 when layoffs and pay cuts were prevalent,
policy makers avoided structural reform and urged "that charity be given sparingly to protect
the poor's ambition").
370. See Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Giving and Social Investment in the United States,
1790-1995,41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 789,790 (1997).
371. Id. at 790, 793 (noting that conservatives have argued for a return to individuals and
communities as sources of charity rather than institutions and governments by quoting
President Bush's introduction in 1988 to his "Points of Light" program where he said: "[alt
the bright center is the individual").
372. The Ford Foundation has provided support to minority and civil rights groups, as
have the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, and the Open Society Institute. In response
to such funding, opponents have criticized these foundations for failing to limit funding to
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welfare agenda, provides support for radical causes, and under-
mines the poor's sense of responsibility."' 3
The principles of charity operate to create a social hierarchy of
authority where philanthropic decision makers are perceived as
possessing superior wisdom and capacity to select the causes and
individuals worthy of aid. 7' Conversely, the needy who appeal for
funds to their benefactors are dependent and constrained.
37 5
Deviation from the norms of gratitude undermines the balance of
power between the donor and the recipient and is unlikely to occur
without negative repercussions for the recipient.
3. Resulting Philanthropic Policies
The culture of charity has failed to develop policies that provide
sustained relief to the poor. 76 The needy receive only a fraction of
philanthropic funds, a statistic that suggests material aid is often
not the purpose of charitable aid.377 Research data indicates that
scientific and medical institutions, libraries, and cultural arts. See DOWIE, supra note 347,
at 36, 40 (noting that conservatives criticize foundations seeking structural reform of public
schools to improve education for the poor); Thomas J. Billitteri, Donors Big and Small
Propelled Philanthropy in the 20th Century, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 13, 2000, at 29
(reporting on political conservatives urging a retreat to a nineteenth-century model when
religious groups were responsible for short-term needs); Pablo Eisenberg, Drucker on
Philanthropy: Without Foundation, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, July 29, 1999, at 40 (describing
criticisms of conservative think tanks such as the Manhattan Institute and the Capital
Research Center toward charities that address social and economic issues such as poverty,
race, and gender).
373. See THE ETHICS, supra note 353, at xxiii (describing attacks on charities and
recipients as being by leftists and radicals).
374. Billitteri, supra note 372, at 29 (describing Andrew Carnegie's imprimatur on
American philanthropy in his exhortation to the wealthy to use their "superior wisdom,
experience, and skills" in selecting the causes to support); see also NAGAI ETAL., supra note
349, at vi (noting descriptions of foundations as the "philanthropic elite" and as the
"Iknowledge class").
375. See Prez, supra note 290, at 360 ("[Tio be indebted is to be subject to an unending
constraint....") (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ONETHICS 118-19 (Lewis White Beck ed.
& Louis Infield trans., 1963)).
376. GOODIN ETAL., supra note 6, at 243-44 (noting that the majority of poor remain poor
despite receipt of private or charitable transfers).
377. DOWIE, supra note 347, at x; see also Estelle James, Commentary, in WHO BENEFITS
FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 244-48 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992) [hereinafter WHO
BENEFITS]; Colin Burke, American Generosity: Its Rise and Fall, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan.
13, 2000, at 56.
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only twenty-seven percent of social services charities claimed to
focus on serving the poor; twenty percent had "some" poor clients;
and fifty-three percent had few or no poor clients.78 Only sixteen
percent of not-for-profit human services organizations provided any
material assistance to the poor.379
That charities have provided less than generous amounts to the
poor has not gone unnoticed. It has prompted investigations and
criticisms about the relatively meager giving and the hoarding of
wealth.' But the trend demonstrates further retrenchment and
decline in charitable donations. Over the past two decades, new
economic elites have donated less than their wealthy predecessors
of earlier years."e Patterns of philanthropic giving continue to raise
questions about charity's purposes in providing for the poor: The
wealthiest foundations give a disproportionately small percentage
of their assets and the size of the awards have not kept pace with
asset growth.38 2
A significant amount of philanthropic dollars are transferred to
organizations that claim to be charities but whose objectives more
accurately reflect the interests and values of those with means.3"s
Moreover, the increasing influence of conservative interests in the
realm of philanthropy has had a significant impact on charitable
378. Lester Salamon, Social Services, in WHO BENEFITS, supra note 377, at 144-47.
379. Id. at 147.
380. See BRILLIANT, supra note 369, at 92 (reviewing the findings of the 1970 Report ofthe
Commission on Foundations and Private Philanthropy and criticizing foundations for
sluggish payout rates to charitable causes); supra notes 358-59, 372-73, and accompanying
text; see also Vince Stehle, The Danger of Comparing Different Types of Giving, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, June 15, 2000, at 54 (reporting mounting criticism of foundations for their
failure to give away enough money each year to justify their tax exemptions).
381. Burke, supra note 377, at 56 (reporting that affluent classes behave differently from
a previous generation of the wealthy contributing to a decline in giving).
382. See Brody, supra note 359, at 922-23 (suggesting that funds be made available for
charities to perform service instead of being held in endowments); Marina Dundjerski,
Playing the Percentages, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 21,1999, at 21 (demonstrating that the
percentage of assets distributed by foundations to charitable causes declined from 7.9% in
1981 to only 4.8% in 1997).
383. Henry Goldstein, Curbing the Shift From Needto Greed, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan.
13, 2000, at 57 (noting that charity has moved from the needs of the poor to reflect the values
and interests of the middle class); see also Brody, supra note 350, at 438-39 (describing
wealthy philanthropic families in Boston who "endowed universities, hospitals, and other
charities ... then managed these endowments by investing in local industrial and commercial
enterprises" which they controlled).
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activities. Conservative foundations have successfully raised and
distributed funds to promote their agenda: private enterprise,
property rights, welfare reform, social entitlement termination,
school vouchers, and faith-based social services.38 ' The emergence
of an activist network of conservative charities belies the myth of
the liberal foundation world and has been a set back for those who
pursue a social justice agenda. 385
When charities do fund antipoverty efforts, their funding
strategies are likely to reflect ideas about the pathology of the
poor. Traditional efforts to improve the morality of the poor
reappear in funding determinations designed to support counseling
or mentoring programs. 86 Noncontroversial poverty programs,
such as food banks, are more likely to be funded than grassroots
organizations, advocacy initiatives, or public policy efforts.3"7
Charities often require donees to avoid activism in general and
provide narrow services at the expense of structural reform.88
384. DOWIE, supra note 347, at 37 (noting efforts of conservative foundations to dismantle
social entitlements); see also NAGAI ET AL., supra note 349, at vi; Elizabeth Greene,
Reinventing Philanthropy on the Right: Changes Spur Debate Over Future of Conservative
Foundations, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 23,2001, at 7 (reporting on the Lynde and Harry
Bradley Foundation, a conservative foundation supporting vouchers for private schools and
the use of religious groups in providing human services, and the John M. Olin Foundation
funding conservative groups such as the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research).
385. See DOWIE, supra note 347, at 22, 40; Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The
Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 509, 511, 541-45 (1998) (describing 'public interest legal foundations" whose
goals are to protect free enterprise and property rights).
386. WAGNER, supra note 262, at 10 (notingthat current charitable trends support funding
for night basketball, Big Brother mentoring programs, and job training instead of direct
material aid to the poor); see Hall, supra note 370, at 792 (noting that some corporations
stress mentoring instead of cash donations); see also DOWIE, supra note 347, at 203 (noting
little enthusiasm by charities for antipoverty initiatives).
387. DOWIE, supra note 347, at 208-09 (suggesting wealthy donors are most likely to
donate funds to programs that they can identify with); see also Hildy Simmons, Symposium:
Corporate Philanthropy Law, Culture, Education and Politics, Luncheon Address, in 41 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REV. 1013,1016-17 (1997) (suggesting corporate investors discourage contributions
to certain charities, and thus force companies to have a diverse investment portfolio).
388. Pablo Eisenberg, Editorial, Nonprofit Groups Must Do More to Fight Harmful
Presidential Policies, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 3, 2001, at 57 (observing that grant
makers are often unwilling to finance advocacy work and prohibit their grantees from
engaging in such efforts); see also DOWIE, supra note 347, at 203 (noting the lack of charitable
funding for activist grassroots organizations). Charities are increasingly structured like big
corporations and businesses, and their giving strategies reflect corporate culture. Justin
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Mainstream groups such as the United Way have historically
resisted the inclusion of social change groups in their on-the-job
giving campaigns." 9 Civil rights organizations that focus on
racism and discrimination are forced to modify their strategies in
order to obtain foundation support."9 Although a new generation
of philanthropists has emerged with profits earned largely from
technology, current patterns differ little from traditional foun-
dations that avoid funding organizations that advocate social
change.3 91
Philanthropic organizations not only fail to provide significant
material aid to the poor, they also interfere with goals of
organizational recipients by requiring modification of programs
hoping to qualify for charitable dollars, often at the expense of
organizational priorities. Organizations dependent on philanthropy
are required to "prospect" for funders at a cost of time, money, and
efficiency, while always mindful of donor interest as a primary
concern.3 92 The unequal power between donor and recipient often
Fink, Philanthropy and the Community, in CRITICAL ISSUES INAMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 143
(1st ed. 1990) (noting that charitably funded groups have been required to offer "hard
services" and abandon "change-oriented activities*); Tom Knudson, Conservation Giants
Grow Rich, RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER, May 27, 2001 at 1A.
389. Stehle, supra note 380, at 53.
390. See DOWIE, supra note 347, at 209 (reporting on the Ford Foundation's splintering,
relocating, and weakening of civil rights groups to appease critics); Michael Ant, Nonprofit
Leaders Urged to Seek Greater Support From Black Donors, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 31,
2001, at 12 (noting that African-Americans have been urged to rely more on African-
American donors to avoid having to distort their message in order to get funding from
established, white-run foundations). Current legislative initiatives to allow charitable
religious groups latitude to discriminate in the hiring and fniing of employees based on
religious beliefs have raised concerns that charities will have greater license to exert their
religious and moral views and shape the nature of social services programs in the name of
giving. Pablo Eisenberg, Senate Should Start Fresh on Crafting Faith Measure, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 23, 2001, at 40.
391. Pablo Eisenberg, Editorial, New Giving Reflects Old Priorities, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 9, 2000, at 34.
392. Susan A. Ostrander & Paul G. Schervish, Giving and Getting: Philanthropy as a
Social Relation, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY, supra note 348, at 74
(describing "prospect" as a term within fundraising literature describing an organization's
constant search for funding opportunities); see also Bullock, supra note 360, at 344-45 (noting
that wealthy donors who determine what to fund often do not make choices that serve the
needs of the poor); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 407,435 (1999) (noting that individual taxpayers have power in determining
government fund allocations to charities).
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forces organizations to adopt donor-determined projects. This
results in fragmented organizations in competition with each other,
often at the expense of those who rely on their services. 9 '
Other inefficiencies result from charity's episodic and inconstant
nature. Donors are wary of dependency by recipients and therefore
disinclined to provide permanent funding, preferring instead to
fund pilot projects. In order to appear competitive to grant makers
who often limit their charity to one-time awards, applicants must
demonstrate their ability to become self-sufficient and must
demonstrate that they possess revenue-generating characteristics
similar to those of the "for-profit world."39' As a result, organi-
zations such as museums and performing arts groups that can
easily generate fees and revenue tend to be more competitive in
fund raising than organizations serving clients unable to pay for
their services. 95 Paradoxically, organizations that rely on charity
are required to alter their objectives in order to appeal to donors,
and thus may lose their effectiveness in responding to the needs of
the poor.
D. Law as Charity
1. The Influence of Principles of Philanthropy on Law for the
Poor
Charity influenced the early development of legal aid and in
recent years has reentered the realm of legal services for the poor
as government subsidies have declined. Programs and their clients
have once again become more dependent on voluntary pro bono
efforts and foundation grants for their survival. 96 The same
393. William F. May, Preface to THE ETHICS, supra note 353, at xiv-xv (observing that
there is little coordination or cooperation among service providers that rely on charities as
they seek funds, a problem which results in conflicting responsibilities and tensions at odd
with the purposes being served).
394. See Lieber, supra note 347, at 737.
395. Goldstein, supra note 383, at 57 (noting that higher education, performing arts, and
museums are more likely to raise revenue through fees and sales and are more competitive
in raising charitable dollars compared with groups serving inner-city and rural minorities).
396. See Legal Services Corporation, LSC Statistics: 1998 LSC and Non-LSC Funding -
AU Programs, at http:/www.Isc.gov/press/pr-progs.html (last visited Nov. 1,2002) (reporting
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principles and ambiguities of philanthropy that affect funding
decisions and charitable acts in other categories of voluntary giving
are mirrored in the decisions of organizations and individual
lawyers that donate to legal services.397 Pro bono service is
generally viewed as a manifestation of public spirit, an expression
of virtue and morality, and an act of individual conscience
motivated by the desire to "do good." 8' At the same time, pro bono
lawyers because of the voluntary nature of their acts, decide who
gains access to the law as well as the nature of problems that will
be addressed. Similarly, charitable organizations that fund legal
services are a part of a larger philanthropic community possessing
the wealth and authority to control the nature of the advocacy
provided by their funding choices. 99 These entities influence the
development of poverty law in the same way they shape social
policies and institutions and with similar, significant repercussions.
The influence of donors on the type of legal services to be
provided was demonstrated with the earliest charitably funded
legal aid offices. Programs were constrained by their funding
sources, requiring them to avoid high profile advocacy as well as
competition with the private bar, thus limiting their services to
statistics for 1998 showing federal LSC funds at fifty-three percent of the total funding, and
private and other non-LSC funding, excluding state and local government grants having
grown to approximately twenty-five percent); Legal Services Corporation, Serving the Civil
Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans (Apr. 30, 2000), at http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/
Exsum.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) (reporting 1999 statistics showing federal LSC funds
down to approximately fifty-one percent of the total funding, and private and other non-LSC
funding, excluding state and local government grants increased to approximately twenty-
seven percent).
397. See Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not to Like About Being a Lawyer?, 109
YALE L.J. 1443, 1448-49 (2000) (noting that legal services are frequently not acknowledged
as valuable contribution to charity).
398. See Hon. Joseph W. Bellacosa, Obligatory Pro Bono Publico Legal Services:
Mandatory or Voluntary? Distinction Without A Difference?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 746
(1991); Michael A. Mogill, Professing Pro Bono: To Walk The Talk, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POLY 5,6 (2001) (describing pro bono contributions as "morally commendable"
and a "common decency") (quoting David Luban, Mandatory Pro Bono: A Workable (and
Moral) Plan, 64 MICH. B.J. 280, 282 (1985)). David Hall has a different emphasis and
suggests that while pro bono is important for the charitable reasons usually proffered, it is
"the saving grace of the legal profession." David Hall, Access to Justice, 70 MIcH. B.J. 1189,
1189 (2000).
399. See supra notes 38-64 and accompanying text (illustrating how charitable
organizations and communities control funding choices).
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small cases.4 "° The culture of charity replicated itself within the
programs; legal aid lawyers had "little interest in litigation" and
even less in testing laws and changing judicial policy.'0 1 Their case
statistics were low in keeping with principles of charitable
constraint.0 2 Foundations continue to have authoritative weight in
the choice of legal strategies employed on behalf of the poor as legal
services lawyers are often required to accommodate the prejudices
and priorities of their funders, regardless of the most critical legal
needs of the poor.' 3
Currently, charitable pro bono services act as a delivery
mechanism of law for the poor and create "unintended cultural
consequences" affecting the value assigned to law for the poor.404
Some pro bono proposals would assign representation of the poor to
those lawyers with the lowest professional status, suggesting a lack
of status and value of legal services for the poor." 5 Moreover, in
recent years, the debate about the pro bono obligations of lawyers
has diverted the profession's attention away from the challenges of
demanding and implementing an adequate and stable publicly
funded legal services program.' ° It has construed the controversy
about law for the poor as a private, moral, or professional obligation
as opposed to a public responsibility. 407
400. Lorenz, supra note 91, at 298 (noting that charitably funded legal aid is limited to
services too small to likely be of interest to private lawyers); see also LAWRENCE, supra note
32, at 37 (asserting that reliance on charity required programs to be cautious about what
cases they undertook).
401. LAWRENCE, supra note 32, at 149 (describing legal aid lawyers as having "little
interest in litigation and even less in appellate advocacy").
402. See KATZ, supra note 74, at 41 (noting that legal aid programs kept their percentages
of litigated cases low to avoid being considered too aggressive).
403. See WEISBROD, supra note 254, at 96 (observing that public interest law firm
dependence on foundations funding affects choices of activities and techniques).
404. Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences ofPublic Policy, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 936, 939 (1991). Pildes uses the phrase to describe the unintended but negative
repercussion of pro bono policies affecting legal services for the poor. Id at 947-51.
405. Id. at 950.
406. Lardent, supra note 70, at 101 (noting that the focus on "mandatory pro bono blurs
the critical issue" of establishing adequate legal assistance for the poor).
407. Id.
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2. Law as Charity: Operative Principles
Principles of philanthropy that distinguish between the
"deserving" and "undeserving" poor continue to penetrate charitable
efforts to provide legal assistance.08 Stigmatization has provided a
means by which to minimize pro bono obligations. 4 9 As a result,
some law firms go to great lengths to avoid direct pro bono service
to the poor.4" Although clearly not descriptive of all lawyers and
law firms, many object to charitable legal work for fear that the
presence of poor people in their offices may " [offend] the aesthetic
and other sensibilities of some clients and firm employees." 1 Those
who do represent the poor on a pro bono basis more readily rep-
resent the elderly, the disabled, and children than those perceived
to be responsible for their poverty.4 2
The charitably funded legal aid program of the past which
limited cases and selected only "worthy" clients is feared to be
the model of the future."" The norms of gratitude and dependency
affect clients as well as legal services programs and their bene-
factors. 4" Legal services programs relying on philanthropy are in
a "state of dependency," and in many ways similar to other not-for-
profit organizations, as they are "dependent on external units for
408. Jacobs, supra note 330, at 515 (relating lawyers' reluctance to do pro bono work to
the tendency of distinguishing between those who deserve assistance and those who do not);
see KATZ, supra note 74, at 40 (noting the exclusion of clients with criminal histories).
409. Silverman, supra note 35, at 956-57 (reviewing the arguments used to oppose
mandatory pro bono). For example, clients who may have spent their rent money "on
something else" are deemed "unworthy." Id. at 956.
410. Id. at 926 (noting that some lawyers and law firms who find poor clients distasteful
try to avoid direct contact with them through "distancing cash contribution[s]" to a legal
services program as a means of discharging their professional responsibilities). It should be
noted that many legal services programs would prefer cash to pro bono services because their
lawyers may be better able to handle poverty related legal matters. Id. at 927.
411. Id. at 936; see also CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 73 (1993) (describing a study demonstrating that many large firms refuse to
represent the poor out of concern that this would offend their wealthy and corporate clients).
412. See Silver & Cross, supra note 397, at 1479 ("All persons of means should be
charitable, especially to widows, orphans, the handicapped, and others whose poverty results
from circumstances that are largely or wholly beyond their control.").
413. See Kilwein, supra note 107, at 62-63 (suggesting that some areas will revert back
to days when there were not legal faculties to assist the poor).
414. See Johnson, supra note 263, at 18 (noting that legal services have been captive to
its principle financial supporters).
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the procurement of resources without having sufficient counter-
vailing powers vis-h-vis these units."
415
3. Programmatic Effects
Common charitable principles are responsible for the historic
insufficiency of funding for legal aid societies; resulting in restricted
client services limited to the most perfunctory tasks, often to the
point of being unable to offer court representation.'16 Philanthropic
contributions are presently inadequate to maintain legal services
programs; indeed, most foundations have been reluctant to fund
any attorney services." 7 Until recently, charitable organizations,
such as the United Way, have historically resisted including legal
services. Although programs currently receive funding, the grants
do not support law reform or civil rights advocacy. 418 Even in times
of generally increased charitable contributions, funds for legal
services agencies have declined." 9 Individual pro bono services
415. Salamon, supra note 378, at 170-71.
416. LAWRENCE, supra note 32, at 20; Houseman,Political Lessons, supra note 74,at 1670-
71.
417. Equal rights groups and legal services combined received only 2.5% of foundation
grants in 1988. Robert A. Margo, Foundations, in WHO BENEFITS, supra note 377, at 224. Of
the nine top recipients of charitable giving, civil rights and legal aid organizations did not
feature. JAMES J. FIsHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 12 (2000)
(citing data from the American Association from Fund-Raising Counsel, Giving USA (1998-
99)). There are notable exceptions including the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie
Foundations, and Open Society. See id. The new philanthropists have also demonstrated an
unwillingness to fund legal services. Eisenberg, supra note 388, at 34.
418. Support for civil rights work has been a minuscule part of total charitable giving.
DOWiE, AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS, supra note 347, at 210 (noting that it has not been "a line
item in the Foundation's Center annual report of giving"); see also Stehle, supra note 380,
at 53 (noting long-standing criticism of the United Way for keeping social change groups out
of the on-the-job giving campaigns); Greg Truog, Editorial, Competition and the United Way,
CHRON. PHnANTHROPY, Apr. 20, 2000, at 36 (criticizing the United Way for failing to fund
civil rights groups); Grant Williams,Advocating Legal Aid to Charties: Report Urges Increase
in Grants for Lawyers Upholding Civil Rights, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 5, 2001, at 7
(reporting on the Rockefeller Foundation's findings that foundations are hesitant to fund
lawyers, particularly civil rights lawyers). But see Thomas J. Billitteri, United Ways Seek a
New Identity, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 9,2000, at 1 (describing the United Way's efforts
to reinvent itself to provide more material aid to the poor and address strategic reforms).
419. Salamon, supra note 378, at 138, 144-47 (reviewing data on charitable contributions
to the human services sector including legal services, and reporting that from 1970 through
1987, charitable contributions increased but allocations to the human services agencies,
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make little impact in the deficit and fail to provide a significant
source of legal aid. 2 The poor and their representatives report
difficulty in securing the services of volunteer lawyers, particularly
in complex matters. 21
Voluntarism as a means for funding legal services can also
compromise legal strategies. Although not descriptive of all volun-
teer attorneys, pro bono lawyers have been reported to abridge their
services and pursue their cases with less than zealous efforts. 422
Many private lawyers motivated by charity are insufficiently
invested in their cases to overcome concerns of provoking the ire of
current or prospective fee-generating clients.4"8 Pro bono services,
like foundation funded projects, do not typically include represen-
tation in matters that challenge structural inequities, nor do they
seek solutions to fundamental injustices. 24
Charity funding brings its own financial and administrative
inefficiencies. Programs are required to expend tremendous
resources seeking grants, which come at the expense of client
services.42' Pro bono contributions are inconsistent and often reflect
including legal services, decreased).
420. Rhode, supra note 326, at 1809. Rhode notes that attorneys who want to do pro bono
cases are discouraged by law office policies that fail to credit such efforts toward billing
requirements nor are these services valued in promotion or compensation considerations.
RHODE, supra note 48, at 38.
421. Greg Winter, Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,2000,
at C5.
422. SMITH, supra note 46, at 43 (noting that the poor who receive pro bono services are
likely to have their cases settled so that the attorney can devote attention to paying clients).
423. See RHODE, supra note 48, at 63 (describing studies of small town lawyers who are
likely to "curtail their representation" of the poor for fear of alienating a paying or
prospective client).
424. Pro bono lawyers are generally unwilling to address fundamental inequities and the
need to accomplish social justice. Jacobs, supra note 330, at 514-15; see also Fink, supra note
388, at 143 (noting that charities funding not-for-profits push them to deliver "hard services"
and ignore "change-oriented" services).
425. See Lardent, supra note 70, at 79 (describing the administrative burdens of seeking
charitable funding); Judith Resnik & Emily Bazelon, Legal Services: Then And Now, 17 YALE
L. & POLY REV. 291, 293 (1998); see also Project to Expand Resources for Legal Services, A
Chart of Significant Fundraising Activities for Legal Services, at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/sclaid/sclaid body.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) (showing how states' legal
services programs obtain funding to support their programs); cf Fink, supra note 388, at 145
(describing the costs on not-for-profits as a result of "incessant scanning of the grants
economy that enable an agency to survive and grow"). Lawyers comment that legal projects
that rely on funds from the private sector may distort client goals. Roundtable Discussion:
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market conditions as opposed to client needs. During economic
downturns, firms often discourage volunteer efforts as a result of
the need to dedicate all available efforts to billable hours. Ironically,
a strong economic market may also discourage pro bono activity
because of the abundance of paying clients.'28
Principles of charity do not inevitably result in donations in
support of legal services for the poor. The reinvigoration of a
laissez-faire market has increased charitable contributions to
entities actively opposed to legal services. 27 Having determined
that their interests are diametrically opposed to law for the poor,
these organizations have been successful in lobbying efforts against
the LSC in Congress and in litigation strategies against legal
services and public interest law firms providing assistance to the
poor.428
Currently, welfare and charity provide insufficient funds for the
task of implementing the principles of the Rule of Law. Subsidies
and charitable acts of giving rest on relationships of inequality
and exact dependency. Public welfare and private charity are
both unstable and impermanent, conditional and contingent.
Voluntarism and philanthropy, in combination with current federal
subsidies, fall short of providing necessary legal services to meet
the needs of the poor.4' At best, law is reduced to largess, contrary
to the principles of equal justice and in all ways insufficient for the
task.
Visions for the Future, Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 729, 736-37 (1998) (remarks of Anthony Alfieri).
426. Jennifer Peltz, Lawyer Group Working to Help Less Fortunate; More Pro Bono Aid
is Encouraged, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 1999, at N3 (reporting that pro bono declines in good
economic times because there is no time for voluntary efforts).
427. A national network ofconservative foundations inaugurated their own public interest
law movement as early as the 1970s and has been influential in legal policy matters in a
range of cases they have characterized as the defense of free enterprise, property rights, and
reduction of government intervention. See supra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
428. NAGAI ET AL., supra note 349, at 38 (noting that the formation of the Washington
Legal Foundation and the Federalist Society as a forum for conservative legal scholars and
law students were both supported by The Sarah Scaife Foundation).
429. LSC programs provide representation to only twenty percent of eligible clients. See
supra note 396.
2002] 817
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
IV. ACTUALIZING THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW
[Congressman:] [WIhat distinguishes the program you represent
from all these others requiring tough funding choices, Small
Business Administration, tree planting, all of these other issues
that are very important to our constituents. And how can you
conceivably distinguish yours?
[Alexander Forger, former LSC President:] Fortunately, I
recalled there was a Constitution. I didn't see anything there
about tree planting or small business, but there was something
about justice in the Constitution, and particularly in its
Preamble. I offered that up as a sufficiently distinguishing
factor.43
National ideals celebrating the Rule of Law convey the law's
potential to serve as a powerful equalizing force, endowed with the
capacity to guarantee rights and resolve disputes peacefully and
equitably. A commitment to these principles should be understood
as an endorsement of the concept that legal justice cannot be
treated as a commodity.4 ' Principles so deeply embedded in the
celebratory narratives of the nation should be insulated from the
vagaries of market forces and protected against shifting political
winds.
Current conditions are not likely to produce such lofty results.
The challenge thus consists of reforming existing institutional
arrangements within the present political and economic environ-
ment. To that end, this Part offers several modest propositions and
urges that the primary mechanism for delivering legal services
to the poor should be a publicly funded and national institution
that is stable, unrestricted, and adequately funded. It suggests
reforms within philanthropy that may serve to realign principles
430. Forger, supra note 138, at 334 (describing questions put to him by a congressman
during the 104th Congress during which efforts were mounted to eliminate funding for legal
services).
431. See David Kairys, Some Concerns About Context and Concentration of Power, 72
TEMP. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1999) ("Monopolization and extreme concentration of power in
law-which potentially encompasses our democratic, participatory, and law-making, as well
as adjudicatory and dispute-resolution institutions-seem different and potentially more
onerous to society than in medicine, finance, or media.").
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and practices of charity in a manner consistent with the funda-
mental values that promote justice and democracy. It advocates the
establishment of a civil Gideon"3 2 to allow all citizens to participate
fully in the legal system.
A. Public Responsibility
1. Expressing National Values
For those who believe that access to the legal system by all
citizens serves the interests of democracy and justice, the need
to support legal services for the poor through a national public
policy financed with federal funds is as self-evident as it is self-
explanatory. Access to the law is a prerequisite for social citizen-
ship. Legal access creates the conditions for mutual respect and
shared values, which are the sources of national cohesion.""3 Access
to the law must be distinguished from commodities bought and sold
in the routine transactions of the marketplace. Recourse to legal
justice should not depend on the accumulation of wealth or the
uncertainties of charity.' What is required is a strong, stable, and
unfettered national legal services program to provide effect to the
eminent status of equal justice in the hierarchy of public values.
In the absence of the guarantee of counsel rooted in
constitutional principles, federal funding alone will not transform
government largess into enforceable rights. Legal services, however,
when firmly embedded within the public trust, assume some of the
qualities of entitlements and are more likely to endure as an
efficient and effective agency.3 5 Although distinctions between
public functions and private sector responsibilities may be blurred,
some fundamental differences exist. The legal needs of the poor are
432. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (establishing a constitutional right
to counsel in criminal matters).
433. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations And Rights Of
Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1721, 1724 (2001) (observing that the reciprocal relationship
between rights and obligations can "create conditions for mutual respect among citizens' and
"facilitate the operation of rights").
434. GOODIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 29-30 (contending that those goods and services so
fundamental to citizens' well-being should be distributed without concern for monetary
payment).
435. D'Alemberte, supra note 189, at 12, 14.
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better served by government programs that operate according to
explicit criteria than private charities whose distributions are
discretionary.43 6 A public institution that distributes benefits in
accordance with objective standards, subject to public scrutiny, is
better suited to assume obligations for financing legal services.
3 7
Although conditions may attach to government benefits, the
possibility exists for challenging unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination in public funding, which is not present in private
funding determinations.3 8
2. Unrestricted Programs: Affecting Outcomes for the Poor
The history of legal services illustrates that during the OEO era,
legal services for the poor were integrated into the national War on
Poverty, and it benefitted from strong federal support and public
guidelines urging law reform activities.3 9 Indeed, exceptional
results were obtained on behalf of the poor. Sweeping legal
reforms in matters of landlord-tenant relations, consumer law,
debtor-creditor relations, and due process protections for welfare
beneficiaries were unprecedented gains of the day.4"0
Susan Lawrence has studied the Supreme Court during this
period extensively."' Her examination of the effect of expanded
access to the Supreme Court's docket reveals how the transition
from charity's legal aid programs to relatively unrestricted,
federally funded legal services programs resulted in new oppor-
tunities for the Court to consider the claims of the poor. " 2 Lawrence
documents that during the nine terms between 1965 and 1974, legal
services attorneys brought 164 cases before the Supreme Court of
436. Cf GOODIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 43 (describing how to tightly target the
distribution of benefits).
437. See Brody, supra note 350, at 443 (restating the view that "only the government can
fairly distribute benefits, free of the paternalism of private charity").
438. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,548-49 (2001).
439. See KATZ, supra note 74, at 91.
440. See Diller, supra note 56, at 1415 (describing Supreme Court decisions that
overturned unconstitutional conditions on the receipt of welfare and tenants' rights to
habitable premises).
441. LAWRENCE, supra note 32.
442. See id. at 3 ("Each age brings the Court its own special anxieties and concerns. The
main outlines of the life of the nation are mirrored in the cases filed with us.") (quoting
Justice William O. Douglas).
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which 119 were accepted for review." She contrasts this to the six
Supreme Court poverty law-related decisions before the OEO legal
services era, and notes that none of them were brought by legal aid
societies.' Legal services programs were successful in sixty-two
percent of the cases they litigated in the Supreme Court, a statis-
tically remarkable rate of achievement, especially because the
government was the opponent in eighty-seven percent of the
cases." This period of strong national policies supporting legal
services witnessed the emergence of poverty law as a distinct legal
genre and a powerful Supreme Court jurisprudence to protect the
interests of the poor."'
Moreover, during the OEO period, publicly supported legal
services undertook a range of advocacy efforts and assumed
enterprising strategies beyond litigation."7 In addition to law
reform in the courts, legal services attorneys succeeded in
influencing the development of statutes and rules affecting the
poor." They worked within a network of community organizations,
which in turn helped to establish program priorities. 449 National
support thus helped to create a legal culture that valued legal
services lawyers and their efforts in defense of the poor.
3. Feasibility Issues
There are at least two signposts to suggest that a national policy
in support of a federally funded legal services program may once
again be achievable: (1) public opinion, and (2) comparative legal
services models that demonstrate its feasibility. First, citizens
differentiate between effective federal programs that help the poor
and wasteful government bureaucracies ." 0 They further distinguish
443. Id. at 9. Legal services also filed a great number of amicus briefs during this period,
totaling twelve percent of all such briefs filed in this time period. Id. at 62.
444. Id. at 9 n.22.
445. Id. at 99-100.
446. Id. at 9-10.
447. See KESSLER, supra note 30, at 4 (describing OEO legal services strategies including
class action litigation and appellate work, as well as lobbying activities).
448. Id.
449. Id. at 74 (describing community groups' influence on the policies of legal services).
450. DAVID STOESZ& HOWARDJACOBKARGER, RECONSTRUCTINGTHE AMERICAN WELFARE
STATE 172 (1992) (reporting that seventy percent of Americans support social programs that
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between programs that are more suitable for charitable operations
and those that are properly the responsibility of the government. 51
More specifically, polls conducted on federally funded legal services
reveal steadfast public endorsement of government support for
programs providing representation for the poor.452 Interestingly, in
a series of surveys, increasing numbers of people responded, albeit
erroneously, that the Constitution provides a right to counsel in
civil matters for persons sued for money who cannot afford to hire
counsel.'
Second, comparative studies of legal services also suggest that
public responsibility for funding lawyers in civil matters is both
normatively desirable and economically feasible. Justice Earl
Johnson, Jr. has studied legal services models in countries with
political and economic structures similar to that of the United
States.' 4 He notes that Switzerland and Germany, both of which
have similar constitutional due process and equal protection
language to that found in the United States Constitution, require
free legal services in civil cases as a matter of constitutional
principle. 55 Public obligations to provide free legal services have
been incorporated into common law principles and statutory law in
help the poor but balk at subsidies for programs that are wasteful).
451. Report, Faith-Based Funding Backed, But Church-State Doubts Abound, at http://
pewforum.orglevents/0410/report/execsum.php3 (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) (revealing a
general consensus that government agencies are better than religious or secular private
groups at providing certain services such as literacy training, health care and job training).
452. See Forger, supra note 138, at 342 (describing a 1996 poll in which people opposed
by a two-to-one margin cutting federal funding for legal services); Johnson, supra note 31,
at 201 (revealing seventy percent of those surveyed said that the government should provide
free legal assistance to someone sued in civil court but who could not afford counsel); Robert
W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POLY REV. 503, 504
(1998) (citing a national study demonstrating that seventy-one percent of Americans favor
government funding to provide lawyers to anyone who needs one); Press Release, Low
Income Legal Assistance Poll, at http:/www.lsc.gov/pressr/pr-,poll.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2002) (publishing a 1999 Harris poll revealing that between sixty-six percent and eighty-one
percent of those surveyed supported the provision of legal services in a variety of civil cases
for the poor).
453. Johnson, supra note 31, at 201; Sweet, supra note 452, at 504.
454. Johnson, supra note 31; Transcript, What 18 Access to Justice? Identifying The Unmet
Legal Needs of the Poor, 24 FORDHAM I'WL. L.J. S187, S190-95 (2000) [hereinafter What Is
Access] (comments from Justice Earl Johnson, Jr. of the California Court of Appeals). For
another perspective, see MAURO CAPPELLErI ET AL., TOwARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1975).
455. Johnson, supra note 31, at 206.
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most European and British Commonwealth nations." 6 In England
and in most Canadian provinces, the amount spent on civil legal
services is a much larger percentage of their overall judiciary
budget than that of the United States. 7 Comparative studies not
only reveal that the United States lags far behind other industrial
democracies in per capita spending for civil legal services, but they
also demonstrate that well-funded legal services do not harm
national economic interests.5 8 These studies provide both incentive
and instruction for providing equal justice to the poor.
Other events suggest an international trend. New reforms have
passed that expand eligibility criteria to ensure that those who need
representation will be assured of access to lawyers." 9 Recent
litigation in South Africa may result in a recognition that consti-
tutional guarantees to a fair hearing require representation by legal
counsel in certain civil cases.46 ° The European Convention on
Human Rights has also been interpreted to require member
governments to provide free legal representation in civil matters as
a means of giving effect to the Convention's mandate to provide a
fair hearing." These events suggest that the state of law for the
poor in the United States does not measure up to developing
international norms.
456. Id. at 210-11 (reviewing constitutional law and statutory rights in England, France,
Germany, Scandinavian and northern European countries, Austria, Greece, Australia, New
Zealand, Hong Kong, and Canadian provinces).
457. Johnson, supra note 253, at 13, 31.
458. Johnson, supra note 31, at 212-15; What Is Access, supra note 454, at S194
(comparing U.S. expenditures at $2.25 per person with English expenditures of $32 per
person and considerably higher amounts expended by the major Canadian provinces, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden). Johnson notes that the data provides reassurance
that adequate funding for guaranteed free counsel in legal matters does not "break the
bank."Id. at 219.
459. Increasing Access to Legal Advice and Assistance, M2-PRESSWIRE, July 11, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 23558441 (reporting on the lowering of eligibility criteria to increase
the number of people eligible for legal assistance in England and Wales).
460. Carmel Richard, Court Asked to Find Farm Workers Have a Right to Free Legal Help,
SUNDAY TwIEs (South Africa), July 1, 2001, available at httpJ/www.suntimes.cozabusine s/
legal/200107/01/carmel0l.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
461. Johnson, supra note 31, at 207 (citing Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 305, 317
(1979)).
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B. Reforms to Charity
The likelihood of continuing dependence on charity is an
inducement for reforms to philanthropic institutions in order to
transform expressions of compassion into commitments to justice.
Charitable endeavors have the potential to give voice to the
interests of the poor and should be encouraged to demand that
government fulfill its obligation to care for all its citizens.""
Reforms have been proposed that democratize the decision-making
processes within philanthropies to include the poor as a means to
promote better funding decisions.' a6 Recommendations include
regulations limiting the size of endowments, mandating the
donation of a larger percentage of foundation assets, and restricting
the number of family members who may serve on a foundation
board.' Other proposals would require foundations to fully disclose
information about their finances and operations." 5
Some oversight commissions recommended that well-established
philanthropic institutions abandon their near-monopoly on
workplace giving campaigns and accommodate new groups that
advocate community causes related to race, class, gender, and
ethnicity. 66 Other studies exhorted philanthropies to increase
funding for lawyers who represent the poor in civil rights and
community economic development projects. 67 Public support exists
for requiring faith-based charities that provide services to the poor
462. Mark Rosenman, Nonprofit Leaders Must Help to Restore the Nation's Democratic
Principles, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 30,2000, at 42 (urging charities to become actively
engaged in advocacy in the realm of public policy on behalf of the poor and organizations that
serve them).
463. DOWIE, supra note 347, at 259-62 (urging charities to work with those who have
experienced poverty or injustice as a means to find more realistic solutions); Truog, supra
note 418 (advocating that charities develop constituent-led strategies to fight poverty).
464. DOWIE, supra note 347, at 258-59.
465. Eisenberg, Why Charities Think They Can Regulate Themselves, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 4, 2000, at 47 (promoting federal responsibility to obtain full financial
and operational disclosure from charities that use funds that would go to federal coffers but
for tax exemptions).
466. Billitteri, supra note 372, at 29 (reporting on the Filer Commission which expanded
the philanthropic community to include organizations representing disenfranchised groups
and individuals).
467. See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
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to adhere to federal legal standards prohibiting discriminatory
practices."8
Reconceptualizing pro bono as a professional obligation in lieu
of a charitable gesture may also promote the ideals of justice and
maximize resources. It may, as expressed in the words of David
Hall, allow lawyers to experience "the saving grace of the legal
profession."6 9 This may increase lawyers' contact with a range of
people and social issues and help put to rest the mythical
characterizations and stigmatization of the poor. Florida's pro bono
plan is an example of modest reforms which seek to increase the
number of pro bono service hours.""0 The key features of the plan
include setting minimum guidelines for annual pro bono
contributions and mandatory reporting of service hours."1 It also
requires local communities to develop pro bono plans, and include
legal services programs well-suited and capable of articulating the
needs of the poor. 72 Although no baseline calculation exists against
which to measure the effectiveness of the plan, it appears that it
has garnered additional resources for the poor in large part because
of the mandatory reporting requirement."" These reforms are
rudimentary, but they may also provide an incentive for additional
scholarly studies on philanthropy and its impact on the poor. The
paramount purpose of these recommendations, however, is to
restore dignity to those dependent on philanthropy and transform
acts of charity into gestures of justice. 7'
468. Cf Laurie Goodstein, Support for Religion-Based Plan Is Hedged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 2001, at A14 (reporting on a poll finding that Americans who approve of giving
government money to religious organizations to provide social services do not want those
groups to proselytize the poor or to use religious guidelines in deciding whom to hire).
469. Hall, supra note 398, at 1189.
470. D'Alemberte, supra note 189, at 13 (describing Florida's pro bono plan).
471. Id. at 13, 19-20 (specifying that pro bono efforts may include either a minimum of
twenty hours of direct legal services per year or an annual buy-out payment of $350).
472. Id. at 25.
473. Id. at 22-23.
474. "Pity may be the perversion of compassion, but its alternative is solidarity." HANNAH
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 84 (1963); see also GORN, supra note 1, at 80 (describing supporters
who opened up their homes and shared food with striking miners as acts of solidarity in
contrast with acts of charity); cf Thomas A. Kelley, Editorial, There's No Such Thing as 'Bad'
Charity, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 9,2001, at 43 (describing the complexities of charity
and the possibilities for empowerment).
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C. A Civil Gideon
The issues that arise in civil matters often implicate the
inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The
poor often face legal issues that have a profound effect on their well-
being and safety, including housing and homelessness, access to
health care, nutrition, protection from violence and abuse, and
general economic exploitation that may render them destitute.
These are fundamental concerns that require adequate legal
representation to give meaning to the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection under the laws. 7 '
The idea of a civil Gideon has been explored by scholars and
practitioners, as well as the Supreme Court.'76 In Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services of Durham County, the Court noted
that special circumstances may require the appointment of counsel
in civil matters and held that in parental termination proceedings
such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.
4 77
Lassiter may be an indication that the right to counsel in civil
matters is evolving in ways similar to the development of the right
to counsel in criminal matters. Prior to Gideon v. Wainwright, in
which the Court upheld the right to appointed counsel in capital as
well as noncapital criminal offenses, the courts approached the
right to an attorney on an ad hoc basis. 78 In deciding Gideon, the
majority explained not only that the decision was a return to prior
precedents, but that "reason and reflection" warranted such a
ruling.'79 Indeed, in his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan traced
the evolution of "the special circumstances rule," by which the right
to counsel had been established, concluding that all criminal
475. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
476. See Lassiterv. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); McKay, supra note 33; Francis
William O'Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1 (1967); Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States' Failure to
Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317 (2001); Sweet, supra
note 452, at 505; What is Access, supra note 454, at S187.
477. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32 (denying the petitioner's right to appointed counsel, but
holding that such right in parental termination proceedings should be determined on a
case-by-case basis and subject to appellate review).
478. Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
479. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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matters were tantamount to special circumstances."o In civil
matters reasoning and reflection may also demonstrate that ad hoc
determinations will render indistinguishable the exception from the
rule, resulting in the expansion of the right to counsel.
In both Velazquez and SCLC, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts respectively based their decisions on the lack of a
constitutional right to legal representation in a civil case.48' But
specific omissions in constitutional language do not necessarily
mean that certain unspecified rights are not inherent in the basic
protections offered by the Constitution.' 2 Constitutional guidance
is often vague, but as Justice Johnson has noted, an emerging
consensus about the meaning of core principles, such as fair hearing
or due process, and equality before the law or equal protection of
the laws, may succeed in locating within the Constitution a right to
counsel in civil matters. 8' The justification for the right to counsel
in civil matters will be substantiated only if courts are asked to
contemplate the ramifications of unassisted litigants in certain civil
controversies, especially in those cases where the outcomes
threaten the litigants' very freedom.' s Moreover, courts must be
pressed to consider the effect of the government's power, derived
from the lack of an enunciation of a constitutional right to counsel
in civil matters, to impose conditions on federal subsidies for legal
services.S5
CONCLUSION
National legal narratives have long paid tribute to the
importance of the Rule of Law and the notion of equal justice.
480. Id. at 350-52 (Harlan, J., concurring).
481. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001); SCLC v. Superior
Court of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506 (E.D. La. 1999).
482. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 243 (1962) ("So far as voting rights are concerned,
there are large gaps in the Constitution. Yet the right to vote is inherent in the republican
form of government envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.") (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
483. Johnson, supra note 31.
484. See Forger, supra note 138, at 337 (noting that the loss of freedom is often considered
no worse than homelessness, domestic violence, or deprivation of other basic needs).
485. See Baker, supra note 260, at 1189 (noting that without a constitutional entitlement,
government may impose conditions to its largess).
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Despite the glorification of legal justice, however, its actualization
has been a function of its commodification: To obtain benefit from
its promise, one has to pay.4"' Government subsidies for legal
services, like welfare programs, generally have provided limited
legal benefits while stigmatizing the poor. Current trends
emphasizing minimal government intervention promise to further
reduce the possibilities for justice. In the absence of adequate
government support, responsibility for providing lawyers for the
poor has shifted to charity. But it has been the "general, though not
universal, view of charitable bodies that those who received their
help had no personal right to claim it."8 Justice should not depend
on charity.
Those who are concerned with transforming the Rule of Law
and the principles of equal justice from the theoretical to the real
must find ways to engage in the "normative enterprise of the law"
and challenge those traditions and practices that limit legal rights
for the poor.' Legal advocates for the poor must consider
possibilities for contesting the proposition of law as largess." 9 Such
efforts may have larger implications as recent economic trends,
which have exacerbated inequalities of wealth, further erode the
attributes of democratic citizenship.49° Therein lies what may be the
most important lesson in Velazquez, correctly characterized as an
act of resistance undertaken despite constraints of dependency:
Courageous challenges serve as reminders that it is only in the
striving that ideals of justice find fulfillment.
486. See supra notes 131, 228, 248, 304, 330-32, and accompanying text.
487. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CONTEMP. POL. PHIL. 291,301 (Goodin
& Pettit eds., 1997).
488. Cf Rubin, The New Legal Process, supra note 66, at 1436 (urging legal scholars to
"frame] prescriptions about how the law should tell citizens to behave, public officials to
decide, and society to organize" through full engagement in the normative enterprise of law).
489. Another challenge to the federal restrictions on legal services has been filed in
Dobbins v. Legal Serv. Corp., No. 97-00182 (E.D.N.Y., friled Dec. 14,2001), which focuses on
the program integrity regulations requiring LSC-funded programs to establish separate
offices in order to use non-LSC funds. The suit claims that the restriction prohibits publicly
funded services from combining with private charitable services to assist poor people. See
Press Release, Foundation, Private Attorneys and Legal Services Lawyers Challenge
Government Bar to Helping Low-Income Clients, at http://www.brennancenter.org/
presscenter/pressrelease_2001_1214.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
490. Kuttner, supra note 109, at 154.
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